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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Question 
 
The thesis investigates which values that have been emphasized in the strategy of the 
Catholic Church in post-communist Poland from the fall of communism in 1989 to 
the ratification of the Concordat in 1998. It also asks how the strategy of the Church 
has been affected by the democratic context. 
 
The research question in this thesis thus has two aspects. The first aspect is a 
description of the strategy of the Episcopate in post-communist Poland. The main 
hypothesis is that the Episcopate’s strategy will become more and more attuned to the 
democratic values of compromise, tolerance and consensus-building. The change will 
happen in the process of “the taming of politics” (Sartori 1995:105). In this thesis 
“taming of politics” is defined as the process in which the democratic values of 
compromise, tolerance, and consensus-building become more visible in an actor’s 
strategy as the democratic regime becomes consolidated. The thesis thus focuses on 
democratic values, and not on the Episcopate’s compliance to the democratic rules. 
The term “taming of politics” process is an important part of the theory which is 
applied in the analysis; the theory of democratic consolidation.  
The second aspect focuses on how the Episcopate’s strategy is affected by the 
democratic context. The theory of democratic consolidation hypothesizes that in the 
consolidation process, the actors engage in a learning procedure. By learning the 
workings of the new democracy, they start to adopt their behavior to democratic 
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norms. In this way they support the consolidation process, and make democracy 
firmer by acting according to the new rules instead of trying to alter them. The theory 
thus hypothesizes that the democratic context will pressure the actors to choose a 
strategy that emphasizes democratic values.   
1.2 Background 
1.3 
When democracy was introduced in Poland, new channels for political participation 
were established, and society experienced growing pluralism. This meant that the 
Church was no longer the unquestionable moral and political authority (Chan 
2000:177). As the spokesman for the Polish Episcopate, Father Adam Schulz 
concluded: “The times when priests told their faithful how to vote are over” (Warsaw 
Voice, 18 October 1998, quoted in Chan 2000:188).  
But Catholicism remains a fundamental element in Polish culture, and Poland is one 
of the strongest Catholic communities in Europe. Because of this strong Catholic 
tradition, Poland was the natural choice when studying a post-communist religious 
actor’s strategy in the new democratic context. According to the Vatican, about 91 
percent of the Polish population is Roman Catholic, and the level of religious activity 
remains high (Chan 2000:176; 191-192).   
The Polish Episcopate 
The Episcopate is a clerical government composed of a hierarchy of bishops. The 
origins of the Episcopate are obscure, but by the second century AD the institution 
was established in the main Christian centers. The Roman Catholic Church is thus 
episcopalian with a single hierarchy terminating at the top with the Bishop of Rome. 
The basis of the system is grounded in the assertion that the power of the Church 
does not derive from human ambition, but strictly from the authority of Christ. From 
this one authority, all legitimate, governmental representation of the authority of 
Christ on earth is derived. The authority is passed on by the Holy Spirit from the 
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Apostles to the bishops, and from bishops to priests, in historical succession 
(Wikipedia 2005).  
The Polish Episcopate will in this thesis be treated as a unitary actor. This is due to 
the fact that it is a hierarchical organization that focuses on inner unity even if 
different groups can be loosely identified inside the Episcopate (Korbonski 
2000a:142-143). This approach can be defended in the literature; the statements of 
the members of the Polish Episcopate reveal that an official common worldview 
exists. 
1.4 Method 
1.4.1 Single-case Study 
The thesis illuminates the research question in a single-case study. The case study 
focuses on the Episcopate’s strategy in post-communist Poland, and how the strategy 
is formed by the democratic context. The thesis is limited to the period from 1989 to 
1998 because in this phase the democratic framework took form. The single-case 
design is selected because the case is longitudinal, which is one of five rationale to 
choose a single-case. A longitudinal case study examines the same single case at 
different points in time, and the theory of interest specifies how certain conditions 
change over time (Yin 2003:42-43). The theory of democratic consolidation predicts 
that the democratic pressure from the environment grows stronger over time. This 
theoretical assumption is best tested by a longitudinal design because it makes it 
possible to see if the strategy of the Episcopate is more marked by a “taming of 
politics” in the later years of the period than in the earlier.  
1.4.2 Case and Context 
Ragin (1992:68) also points to the importance of context in case studies: “Different 
parts of the whole are understood in relation to one another and in terms of the total 
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picture or package that they form”. Enyedi (2003:230) states that this is also true for 
the field investigated in this thesis: “Both church and state are part of the political 
institutional setting that surrounds us, and therefore they should not be studied in 
isolation”.  
Case studies are recommended when the goal is “to retain the holistic and 
meaningful characteristics of real-life events”. The case study method gives a deep 
understanding of how different social phenomena work, and why they are as they are. 
A case study approach also gives a possibility for taking the context into 
consideration, and the inclusion of surroundings could lead to the discovery of 
important nuances and explanatory factors (Yin 2003:2). 
The thesis is based on the methodological assumption that the surroundings interfere 
with the study object. Yin (2003:13) defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry 
that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its context”, and where it is 
difficult to draw sharp boundaries between the phenomenon and its context. The 
context is not explicitly defined; it contains both specific actors in the democratic 
environment, the values and rules of a democratic regime, and the exact form of 
liberal democracy in Poland. Because of the undefined nature of the context, it is 
difficult to draw sharp boundaries between the phenomenon and its context.  
The theory of democratic consolidation assumes that the democratic behavior of the 
Church is reinforced by operating in a democratic environment, where undemocratic 
strategies are sanctioned by the other actors. It seems reasonable to call Poland 
democratic since the democratization process has continued throughout the period 
investigated without regime break-down. The three branches of government; the 
executive, the legislative and the judiciary, have been in function for the whole period 
and there has not been any serious attempts to threaten the new order. Therefore, in 
this thesis, the environment will be treated as undergoing democratic consolidation, 
and seen as having a potential to exercise democratic pressure.  
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1.4.3 A Discriptive and Explanatory Case 
Yin (2003:3) divides case studies into three different types: descriptive, exploratory 
and explanatory. The first part of my research question requires a descriptive case 
study. This part of the thesis describes which values that have been emphasized in the 
Polish Episcopate’s strategy in the new democratic context. The second part of the 
research question necessitates an explanatory case study because it tries to explain 
how the democratic context affected the strategy choices of the Episcopate in the 
post-communist period.  
1.4.4 Analytical Generalization 
In analytical generalization previously developed scientific theory guides the 
researcher when comparing the empirical results to the theoretical model. The 
objective is to link case studies, with its awareness of context, to the traditional 
schools of social science. But a single-case seldom gives the opportunity for 
analytical generalization, and therefore more research is needed on this field in order 
to achieve analytical generalization (Yin 2003:32-33).  
In spite of the limited possibilities to generalize, I chose to conduct a single-case 
study. The single-case study gives an opportunity to see the case in many different 
settings. The method explores in depth the different aspects of the Episcopate’s 
strategy, and therefore presents a fuller picture of the case. This picture may have 
been lost in a multiple-case design. The multiple-case design would have given 
firmer guide lines as to which empirical examples it was possible to choose because 
the focus would have been on the comparing of two cases. In this way, the 
particularities of the Polish case could have been overlooked. In addition, a second, 
or even a third, case would have required deep knowledge of the contexts, a 
knowledge I sadly only have in the Polish case. Because of the extra time this design 
had necessitated, I rather prioritized to finish the thesis on scheduled time.    
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1.5 Validity and Reliability 
There are three main types of validity according to Yin (2003:34); construct validity, 
internal validity and external validity. In addition to securing that the validity 
questions are paid attention to, scientific research has to focus on reliability issues. 
1.5.1 Construct Validity 
To secure that the criteria of construct validity are met, Yin (2003:35) suggests 
covering two steps. The first step is to select the specific types of change that are to 
be studied, and to relate these changes to the original objectives of the study. In this 
thesis the type of changes that is focused on, are changes in the Episcopate’s strategy 
in the post-communist era. The eventual changes in the Episcopate’s strategy are 
measured against the theoretical implications of the theory of democratic 
consolidation.  
The second step that Yin (2003:35) recommends to secure construct validity is to 
demonstrate that the selected measures of these changes do indeed reflect the specific 
types of changes that have been selected. My thesis relies on statements and actions 
of the central actors in the Polish Episcopate. These statements and actions are 
intended to reflect the values of the Episcopate. The research design tries to secure 
the results against putting to much weight on “empty talk” by focusing on areas 
where the interest of the Church may clash with the norms of democracy. These 
areas, called challenges in the theory of democratic consolidation, materialize in three 
main forms; the ideological challenge, the social challenge and the political 
challenge. Under each challenge, two empirical examples are chosen to secure that 
the full picture has as little bias as possible.  
1.5.2 Internal Validity 
Internal validity is a concern when the investigator tries to determine whether event x 
leads to event y. To improve the internal validity of a case study, Yin (2003:116) 
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advises pattern matching. This method compares an empirically based pattern with a 
theoretically generated one. I have used pattern matching in this thesis as a way of 
analytic manipulation. By making a matrix of theoretical categories; the ideological, 
social and political challenges of democracy, and then by placing the evidence within 
these categories, I have tried to upgrade the internal validity (Yin 2003:112).  
It is also important to consider rival explanations in order to enhance the internal 
validity (Yin 2003:36). The theory of democratic consolidation assumes that a 
democratic mind-set is strengthened in the presence of a democratic environment. 
The main rival explanation of the Episcopate’s behavior is that the democratic 
environment does not affect the strategy of the Episcopate in the way predicted by the 
theory. In this case, “the taming of politics” will not be visible in the Episcopate’s 
statements and actions in the post-communist era. The analysis tries to be open to 
other interpretations than the ones given by the theory of democratic consolidation. It 
does not, however, investigate the possible rival explanations since this is outside the 
scope of this thesis.     
1.5.3 External Validity 
External validity addresses whether a study’s findings are generalizable beyond the 
immediate case study (Yin 2003:37). This thesis does not have an explicit 
generalizing aim, but it can be a starting point for further investigation on how a 
religious organization adapts to a new democratic context. The replication logic 
described by Yin (2003:37) underlines this thought; the theory must be tested by 
replicating the findings in a second or even a third case where the theory specifies 
that the same results should occur. Therefore, the case study can not be used with a 
generalizing aim without the support of other case studies. 
1.5.4 Reliability 
The goal of reliability is to minimize the errors and biases in the study. The reliability 
test’s objective is to ensure that a later investigator, who followed the same 
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procedures and conducted the same case study, would arrive at the same findings and 
conclusions. It is therefore imperative to document the procedures one follows (Yin 
2003:37-38). 
This thesis is based on existing literature. Thus, the sources may be addressing other 
research questions than the ones the researcher is trying to answer. In my 
investigation this has not been a problem because the English literature on the role of 
the Roman Catholic Church in post-communist Poland is relevant for the research 
question in this thesis. Another problem can be that existing literature decreases the 
ability to control the quality of the research. I have avoided this problem by using 
sources from recognized scientific journals and books. A third problem when using 
existing literature is bias because data can be affected by prejudices of the researcher. 
Some of the sources used in this thesis were biased. I am aware of this problem, and 
as far as possible I have tried to compensate for bias by using multiple sources; the 
principle of investigator triangulation (Yin 2003:98). Investigator triangulation 
increases the reliability of the results in this thesis. This is because the reliability of 
the conclusions drawn is augmented when the findings in one source is supported by 
the assumptions in another source. 
Unfortunately, I have not been able to use the firsthand Polish statements as sources. 
This disadvantage is due to the fact that the material is unavailable because of the 
language barrier1.   
1.6 Plan 
The goal of this thesis is to describe the behavior of the Polish Episcopate in post-
communist Poland, and to address how this behavior has been affected by the 
democratic context. The remaining of the thesis will be organized in the way 
described below. 
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Chapter 2 gives a historical overview of the Church’s role in Poland in the last two 
centuries. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework of this thesis, and underlines 
the main challenges religious organizations face in a democratic environment.  
Chapter 4 discusses how the Polish Episcopate has handled the ideological challenge 
of democracy. Two questions are debated in this chapter, first the Episcopate’s 
approach to liberal democracy is analyzed. The second part of this chapter discusses 
the Episcopate’s relationship with religious minorities. The two themes of this 
chapter are selected because they show two different aspects of the ideological 
challenge.  
Chapter 5 analyzes the Episcopate’s strategy toward the social challenge of 
democracy. In this chapter, two aspects of the social challenge is presented; abortion 
politics and religious instruction in public schools.  
Chapter 6 examines the Polish bishops’ approach to the political challenge of 
democracy. The chapter evaluates the debates on the constitution and the Concordat2. 
These two debates define the political scope of the Church, and its place in relation to 
other actors on the political scene. The political framework in Poland is very 
important for the conditions under which the Church will operate, and the debates 
that form this framework are therefore equally important.    
Chapter 7 sums up and presents the main conclusions. 
 
                                                                                                                                           
1 I do not speak Polish. 
2 The Concordat is the treaty which regulates Poland’s relationship with the Holy See. 
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2. Historical Overview 
 
2.1 
2.2 
Introduction 
In post-communist Poland historic experiences plays a central role, and nation-
builders compete to define the past in their own image. It is therefore imperative to 
have knowledge of the past when analyzing the role of the Polish Episcopate in the 
present. The past is also important because the intertwining of Catholicism and 
nationality in Poland is widely recognized, and is probably the defining aspect of 
political culture in contemporary Poland (Chan 2000:176, Holm-Hansen 1999:30, 
Szajkowski 1997:158).  
The Polish Catholic Church has experienced enduring support in the population for 
about two hundred years, and is the strongest church in Central Europe (Szajkowski 
1997:160). The church strengthened its role considerably in the period of communist 
rule from 1945 to 1989, and the clerical hierarchy enjoyed an enormous legitimacy 
when the autocratic regime collapsed in the late 1980s. One telling testimony of the 
Church strength is that the first non-communist Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki 
drew attention to the vital role of Catholicism in Poland in his first public statement 
(Brzezinski 2000:87, Ramet 1991:260).   
The Parted Nation 
Traditionally, Poles have seen themselves as defenders of Western Civilization, and 
of Christianity, and as a bulwark against “the barbaric East” (Holm-Hansen 1999:20-
21). The notion of the mission of the Polish nation was underlined during the 
partitions. These partitions began in 1795 and meant that Poland as a state was 
completely wiped from the map, and its territory became divided between Russia, 
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Prussia and Austria. The partitions lasted for over 100 years, and the Polish state was 
not reestablished until after the First World War, in 1918 (Seim 2002:27). 
During the years when the nation was divided, the Poles underlined their identity by 
connecting the Catholic faith with Polishness. The religious part of the Polish identity 
was reinforced because public use of the Polish language was prohibited in the 
Russian and Prussian parts of the former Polish territory. This left Catholicism as the 
only possible marker of Polishness, and religious symbols, like the icon of the Black 
Madonna, became symbols not only for Christianity, but also for Poland’s resistance 
to foreign tyranny (Chan 2000:176, Mach 1997:63, Szajkowski 1997:159, 
Weclawowicz 1996:10).  
2.3 The Legacy of Roman Dmowski 
In the interwar period, Poland was once again united. In this era, the role of the 
Catholic Church was strengthened by the thoughts of Roman Dmowski (1864-1939). 
He was the main ideologist of the Polish integral nationalism in the interwar decades. 
This nationalism was concentrated around the National Democratic movement, the 
so-called “endecja”. In 1926 Dmowski established the Camp of Great Poland3 
(OWP), and became the undisputed leader of this organization. OWP turned out to be 
a success, and it became a dynamic force on the political scene. At the end of the 
1920s the movement had the allegiance of the majority of politically active young 
Poles, and was especially popular among university students (Walicki 2000:31).  
As ideologue of the OWP, Dmowski stated: “Catholicism is not an appendage to 
Polishness… it is embedded in its essence, and in a large measure it is its essence. To 
attempt to dissociate Catholicism from Polishness, and to separate the Polish nation 
from its religion and the church, means to destroy the very essence of that nation” 
(Walicki 2000:31-32). 
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Although Dmowski had strong support in certain segments of the population, the 
political leadership of the time was anti-clerical, and Dmowski’s party was to a 
considerable extent isolated. As a consequence of this lack of allies and of the 
political realities in interwar Poland, the organization was banned by the authorities 
in 1933 (Davies 1981:419). But in post-communist Poland, the thoughts of Dmowski 
have been revitalized. Cardinal Jozef Glemp, Head of the Polish Catholic Church 
since 1981, does not conceal his sympathy for Dmowski, and credits him for 
understanding the indissoluble moral bond between the Polish nation and its church 
(Walicki 2000:37).  
Dmowski’s thoughts are not only appreciated in clerical circles. On January 8, 1999, 
Dmowski was honored with a Sejm4 resolution for his services to the fatherland: 
“Particularly important was Dmowski’s role in emphasizing a close linkage of 
Polishness with Catholicism – a linkage which was indispensable for the survival of 
the Nation and the restoration of the State. The Sejm of the Republic of Poland 
expresses its appreciation for an outstanding Pole, Roman Dmowski” (Walicki 
2000:43-44).  
In conclusion, the thoughts of Roman Dmowski has strengthened the fusion between 
nationalism and Catholicism in Poland, hence the famous Polish equation “Polak = 
katolik”5 (Kloczowski 2000:339).   
2.4 
                                                                                                                                           
The Era of Communist Rule 
Communist ideology divided the world into good and evil, black and white, and 
made politics into a zero-sum game (Higley et al. 1996:133). Because of this political 
polarization, it was nearly impossible to make compromises on ideological issues. 
3 Obóz Wielkiej Polski. 
4 The name of the Polish Parliament is the Sejm. 
5 “Pole=Catholic”. 
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Instead the political scene became increasingly divided. In this climate, 
confrontations were common, but the Church also negotiated with the regime several 
times during the communist era. These negotiations often took place in periods when 
the regime was weak and needed a broader base of support to stay in power. The 
combination of confrontation and compromise marked the Church’s approach to the 
communist authorities throughout the period (Morawska 1995). 
During the last phase of the communist era, the Catholic Church became increasingly 
critical toward the state authorities. The Church managed to become the focal point of 
opposition and a defender of “the national ethos”. In this way, the Roman Catholic 
Church became a symbol of the free and united Polish nation. The Church presented 
itself as the only authentic institution in Polish society, and the cultural conflict 
between “us – the people” and “them – the state” was reinforced (Byrnes 2001:27, 
Szajkowski 1997:157-158).  
The influence of the Polish Catholic Church in society was increased during the 
communist era. While in the interwar period the overall political influence of the 
Church hierarchy declined in relative terms, the direct assault on religious freedom by 
the communist regime transformed the Church in the eyes of society. It became a 
bearer of national independence, and it also provided opportunities to express 
opposition to the regime in forms that in periods were tolerated by the regime. These 
signs of opposition were for example religious festivities and political criticism 
during masses (Michta 1997:73, Szajkowski 1997:161).  
During the last two decades of communism, the church actively began to fight the 
regime and its doctrines and moral standings, and the pulpits offered a chance to 
speak uncensored about political realities (Michta 1997:73, Szajkowski 1997:161). 
At the beginning of the 1980s, the Solidarity movement was formed. The Church 
played an important role in the movement’s establishment, and religious symbolism 
became the main way of expressing the struggle for national independence. The 
Church’s strategy toward the communist regime was still marked by a combination of 
confrontation and compromise. The strategy was visible during the round table 
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negotiations where the Church chose a moderate stance, and played the role of 
mediator between the Solidarity movement and the communist regime (Szajkowski 
1997:161).  
The Church’s active role in the fall of communism meant that the Episcopate from 
the start had strong ties to the Solidarity movement, and to the organization’s leader 
Lech Walesa, who is a devoted Catholic. As a consequence, when the old regime 
collapsed, the Roman Catholic Church in Poland had many connections within the 
new elite, and the institution was looked upon as a natural ally in the reestablishment 
of the free and authentic Polish nation in the post-communist era. 
2.5 Chapter review 
Catholicism has been an important element in Polish culture for several hundred 
years, but the equation between being Polish and being Catholic was first made 
during the partitions. In the interwar period the equation was emphasized in the 
thoughts of Roman Dmowski, but the Catholic Church still had a limited impact on 
the identity formation of the broader public. With the communists’ open attack on 
religious freedom, the Church’s role in society changed. The ideology of the Church 
became the main opponent to secular communism, and much because of the strength 
of the Church, communism was never rooted in Polish society.    
The strategy of the Episcopate during communism emphasized the differences 
between the communist regime and the ideology of the Church, and the Episcopate 
had advocated freedom and democracy during autocratic rule. In the new era large 
segments of the new elite were positive to an enhanced role of the Episcopate, and 
the clerical institution was expected to act like a guardian of the new system. When 
the socialist empire collapsed, the national feeling of pride and gratefulness toward 
the Church made the institution a powerful actor in post-communist Poland. It was 
considered the natural defender of Polish interests, and its popularity rose 
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drastically6. The Church leadership stressed their own role in Poland’s liberation, and 
reconfirmed their duty to guard the Polish nation – also against the evils of the future.  
                                              
6 In 1990, 90 percent of Polish citizens rated the Roman Catholic Church as the most respected institution in society 
(http://countrystudies.us/poland/40.htm).  
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3. Theoretical Approach   
 
3.1 Introduction 
3.2 
In democracies, religion and politics are often intertwined. Not only is religion a 
political issue, but politics itself is regularly affected by religious considerations. The 
examples are many; abortion and the role of women in society, church-state relations, 
freedom of belief, ethno-religious disputes as well as educational matters (Girvin 
2000:7). In Poland, it was necessary to solve all these issues in the first democratic 
decade, and the intertwining of religion and politics has therefore been especially 
visible in the post-communist period. 
According to the theory of democratic consolidation, the Polish Episcopate will 
choose self-limitation as the institution learns about the mechanisms of the new 
regime. Consequently, the Church hierarchy will be a part of the national democratic 
learning process. In this process the values and actions incompatible with liberal 
democracy gradually lose their credibility. The actors will emphasize the values of 
democracy in their strategies, and consequently a “taming of politics” will occur 
(Anderson 2003b:75).      
Democratic Consolidation 
One possible definition of democratic consolidation is presented by Anderson 
(2003a:137-138). In his view democratic consolidation involves changing the 
practices and attitudes of public and elites toward political power. Political leaders 
have to acquire the skills of bargaining and negotiation in a more open political 
setting, and to be willing to abide by the democratic rules of the game. The definitive 
goal of democratic consolidation is to obtain a mentality where tolerance of 
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alternative views and commitment to change by peaceful means prevail (Anderson 
2003a:137-138). 
The notion of democratic consolidation is further elaborated by Berglund, Aarebrot, 
Vogt and Karasimeonov (2001:10-11). These researchers describe democratic 
consolidation as “the process whereby a state and its citizens gradually assume 
democratic ideals and practices and cultivate these ideals and practices, while they 
are simultaneously constrained by, or at least aware of, other, less democratic 
possibilities and practices”. They continue to say that “democratic consolidation 
essentially refers to the process by way of which democracy is intensely tested and as 
a result becomes firmer” (Berglund et al. 2001:10-11).  
The process of democratic consolidation eliminates the values and actions which are 
not compatible with democracy by causing a moderation of political conflicts in a 
process of mutual adaptation to the new democratic context.. When this elimination 
has taken place, the regime becomes less exposed to irreconcilable disputes and 
struggles. In other words, the moderation of political conflict is an important element 
in the consolidation of democracy because it makes the actors stop looking at 
themselves as engaged in a zero-sum conflict (Valenzuela 1992:82). The 
development of moderation in political conflicts is emphasized in Sartori’s 
(1995:105) term “taming of politics”. “Taming of politics” has taken place when 
there is a shared acceptance of democratic values which emphasize accommodation 
and cooperation; compromise, tolerance and consensus-building (Anderson 
2003a:137-138, Higley et al. 1996:133).  
According to the theory of democratic consolidation the democratic framework 
influences the behavior of the Polish Episcopate in a way that makes its actions more 
attuned to the democratic setting. The thesis focuses on internal democratic 
consolidation, and stresses the democratic context’s impact on one actor. It is 
hypothesized that the actor, by taking actively part in the new regime, learns about 
the appropriate behavior in a democracy. As a consequence, the actor will adjust its 
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strategy according to the norms of compromise, tolerance and consensus-building, 
and thus contribute to the “taming of politics”. 
3.3 The Challenges of Democratic Consolidation  
From the point of view of religious organizations, democracy can be a mixed blessing 
for their position; ideologically, socially and politically (Anderson 2003a:138, Stepan 
2000:39). Religious organizations are challenged when the democratic style of 
bargain and compromise meets the absolutist ideals of religion. Since the Polish 
Episcopate has lived under autocratic rule, their focus has been on how to handle the 
challenges of communist rule, and this regime’s hostility toward religion. In this 
battle, internal unity was of vital importance.  
Consequently, as the rest of the Roman Catholic Church was divided over the 
Vatican II Council’s accommodating approach toward secular power, the Polish 
Episcopate stayed united, and Primate Wyszynski, who led the Episcopate at the 
time, did not accept any deviation among his subordinates. The Primate therefore 
chose to support the traditionalistic minority in the Vatican II to avoid discord and 
agonizing debates. As a consequence, the Polish Episcopate remained largely 
unconvinced of the new and more liberal Vatican II principles (Korbonski 
2000a:142-145).  
The Second Vatican Council, or Vatican II, was an ecclesial, theological, and 
ecumenical congress convened in the autumns of the four years from 1962 to 1965.  
Pope John XXIII convoked the Council on October 11, 1962, and with bishops from 
all over the world, sought to define the nature, scope, and mission of the Church 
(Sepulveda 2005). The Vatican II Council marked a fundamental shift toward the 
modern Church, and the Council made conciliation with secular powers on Catholic 
social teaching possible. While the basic doctrines of the Church did not change, the 
influence and documents of the Council created more profound changes for the 
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Catholic Church than had occurred in the previous five hundred years (Sepulveda 
2005).  
3.3.1 The Ideological Challenge 
Ideologically, religious organizations have to adapt the “absolute truth” of religion to 
the compromises of democracy. If the “absolute truths” are not moderated, it is 
difficult for religious organizations to be tolerant toward dissident groups in society, 
and especially toward religious minorities, since their “truths” are “different truths”. 
Therefore, if differences instead of similarities are emphasized, it is difficult to build 
consensus in the new democracy. Consequently, the “taming of politics” is slowed 
down, and the process of democratic consolidation is delayed. 
3.3.2 The Social Challenge 
Socially, religious organizations have to find a way to deal with the processes of 
secularization. The secularization process can be defined as the process through 
which religious thinking, practice, and institutions lose their religious and/or social 
significance. The concept is based on the theory which says that as societies become 
industrialized their religious morals, values, and institutions is partly replaced by 
secular ones (Research Machines plc 2005). In post-1989 Poland, the process of 
secularization has become far more pronounced as the Polish society grows closer to 
the Western world.  
3.3.3 The Political Challenge 
Politically, religious organizations may have to redefine their role to avoid public 
resentment over excessive non-elected clerical intervention in public life because 
democratic rule is based on elected leadership. The moderation of clerical 
intervention may prove to be a serious challenge to the Polish Episcopate because of 
their active political role during communism.   
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3.4 Chapter review 
“The taming of politics” predicts that the actors, in the process of democratic 
consolidation, adapt to democratic values. In that way they reinforce the new form of 
governance. Consequently, democracy enhances its likeliness to endure because it is 
strengthened when the actors support democratic values instead of trying to alter 
them. Democracy can be a mixed blessing for religious organizations because the 
new regime challenges their position ideologically, socially and politically. In the 
next chapters, the thesis discusses a broad range of issues to answer how the strategy 
of the Church has developed in the post-communist period, and to analyze how the 
democratic context has affected the strategy of the Episcopate.  
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4. The Ideological Challenge of Democracy 
 
4.1 Introduction 
4.2 
Bargaining, compromise and consensus-building are vital parts of a democracy. 
Ideologically, the challenge is that religious principles, if taken literally, describe 
absolute ideals. These absolute ideals can create hindrances for tolerance of other 
views in the areas where religion holds the answers. But religion does not necessarily 
have this effect, and there are several examples around the world were different 
religious groups are living in peaceful coexistence, and where religious leader and 
groups front the work for enhanced tolerance in society. Sadly, also the opposite 
situations can be found. 
In Poland, the Church-State relationship has been a controversial issue, and several 
analyses have pointed to the Episcopate’s dilemmas in the new democratic 
environment. The Church under communist rule held absolute truths against a 
“system of godlessness”. The division of society into good and evil did not fit the 
new democratic system of uncertainty, compromise, bargaining and negotiation 
(Anderson 2003a:152). In this chapter I will analyze how the Polish Church has 
handled the ideological challenge of democracy. The first section presents the 
hierarchy’s approach to liberal democracy. The second section shows the 
Episcopate’s tactic toward religious minority groups. 
Attitude toward Liberal Democracy 
A basic precondition for a new democracy to become consolidated is that the actors 
support the principles on which this form of government is founded. The Episcopate 
had long advocated democracy and rule of law during autocratic rule, but in the post-
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communist era it became clear that the Episcopate expected certain limitations on 
democratic rule (Chan 2000:185, Eberts 1998:820). 
Sartori (1995:102) decomposes the elements in the normative notion of “liberal 
democracy”. He states that this term is composed of two interconnected elements. 
One is liberalism – freeing the people, and the other is democracy – empowering the 
people. The first principle dictates how decisions are made; the second regards what 
is decided. In practice, the questions of how decisions are made and what is decided 
are intertwined. This can be seen in the statement of the Secretary of the Episcopate, 
bishop Pieronek: “For the Church an unquestionable shortcoming of democracy is 
its inseparable feature – the principle of majority. This principle can not be applied 
to essential issues, that is, to those which relate to faith or morality, within the 
Church as well as outside it” (quoted in Anderson 2003b:169, and in Mach 2000:12). 
In this statement the bishop criticized both of the elements Sartori (1995:102) 
considers to be the core elements of liberal democracy.  
First, bishop Pieronek criticized the most common way to make decisions in a 
democracy; majority rule. This statement thus criticized how decisions are made; the 
liberal element of liberal democracy. This is a well known dilemma in democratic 
theory. To define democracy as majority rule creates a normative problem. In 
societies with long-term cultural, religious or ethnic conflicts, this rule can be a 
disadvantage to a stable minority. Therefore, majority rule seems less acceptable the 
more fundamental the interests are (Østerud 2002:140-142).  
The second aspect of Sartori’s definition of liberal democracy; the element of 
democracy, is also criticized by bishop Pieronek. This element concerns what is 
decided. Bishop Pieronek argues, on behalf of the Polish Episcopate, that moral 
issues should be taken off the political agenda in post-communist Poland. This has 
not been normal practice in other European countries with a Catholic majority. In 
issues which relate to faith or morality, Western democracies have normally chosen 
not to eliminate these issues from democratic rules and procedures, and this tendency 
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has been reinforced over the decades (Minkenberg 2003:195-217, Madeley 2003:1-
22, esp.16).   
Democratic rules and norms applied on moral issues can for example be seen in two 
democratic Catholic countries in Europe, Ireland and Spain. In Ireland, issues of faith 
and morality were handled within the democratic framework when the abortion issue 
was subject to referendum in 1992 (Cap 2004:10). In Spain, there was fierce clerical 
opposition toward the partial decriminalization of abortion in the early 1980s, but the 
striking feature of Church-State relations was its consensual nature because few 
actors wanted to resurrect the polarization that had caused such major divisions 
within Spanish society in the past (Anderson 2003a:143). Consequently, compromise, 
tolerance and consensus-building were vital aspects in both the Irish and the Spanish 
Catholic Churches’ approaches to liberal democracy and secular democratic power.  
In Poland on the other hand, skepticism has been a striking constituent in the 
Episcopate’s approach to liberal democracy. The accommodating styles on issues of 
faith and morality which can be seen in other European democracies, have been 
nearly absent in Poland. The Polish Episcopate’s attitudes toward the secular state 
seem more irreconcilable, and the Polish bishops also seem less ready to make the 
compromises their counterparts in other Catholic countries have made.  
Skepticism toward the new regime can also be seen in official statements of the 
Polish Episcopate. In a pastoral letter in 1991 the Episcopate warned of a new threat 
facing the country: “Yesterday it was the East, but today the West will insist that 
Poland fully accept social, political and also whole-hearted religious liberalism. So 
we are confronted with a new form of totalitarianism, which is intolerant of good, of 
God’s laws, so that with impunity we may propagate evil and in effect once again 
wrong the weakest” (quoted in Anderson 2003b:181).  
The official statement shows the harsh language used by the Polish Episcopate, and 
its tendency to view the world in black and white. Sartori’s “taming of politics” 
predicts that the process of democratic consolidation will make the Episcopate stop 
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looking at the world in this polarizing way. An actor in a democratic context will be 
“tamed” because it risks alienating its supporters if its strategy is too rigid compared 
to the rest of the actors in the environment. Because democratic rule underlines 
tolerance, consensus-building and compromise, an actor who does not follow these 
norms becomes negatively exposed in such a context. Therefore it is in the actor’s 
own interest to choose a more accommodating approach.  
According to the theory of democratic consolidation, in order to be integrated in the 
democratic framework, a pressure from the environment to act in line with 
democratic norms emerges. Since this statement is from 1991, one should not read 
too much into the fact that the Episcopate’s behavior goes against the implications of 
the theory. Since democratic consolidation is a process, one would rather expect that 
the actor’s strategy is a result of exposure to both settings; the prior autocratic 
environment and the new democratic context. 
Some years later, another official statement from the Episcopate once more warned 
against liberalism: “Both in the practice of totalitarian systems and in the theories 
advocated by extreme liberalism, attempts are made to blur differences between good 
and evil and to regard temporary achievements as the ultimate measure of morality” 
(quoted in Michnik 1998:1). Again the black-and-white-thinking is prominent, but 
now the warning is against extreme liberalism. The positive interpretation of this 
quotation is that the Episcopate is not opposed to liberalism as such, but only when it 
has extreme consequences. If this interpretation of the quote is the basis for a 
theoretical analysis, the theory of democratic consolidation is supported by the 
Episcopate’s behavior. During these years, one might be able to see a moderation in 
the hierarchy’s stance, but the polarization of the world into good and evil is still very 
visible.  
 
This might be a right interpretation, but skepticism toward liberalism is still striking 
in some segments of the Episcopate even in the late 1990s. An example of this view 
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is expressed by Archbishop Jozef Michalik: “The same lay ideology that has been 
imposed on us over the years assumes today the name of liberalism and nihilism. As 
the East before, now also the West demands that Poland accept full social, political, 
ideological, as well as religious liberalism. Thus we face, now, a new form of 
totalitarianism” (quoted in Michnik 1998:1). Michalik was elected vice chairman of 
the Episcopate at the end of the decade investigated in this thesis, and is an important 
figure in the Polish hierarchy. He has repeatedly attacked the notion of liberalism, 
and he has stated that the concept is marked by “a totalitarian intolerance of the 
divine laws” (Walicki 2000:41).  
These quotations show that there are several views toward liberalism within the 
Polish Episcopate, but it seems that the skeptics within the institution have the upper 
hand. The Polish Episcopate’s skeptical attitude toward liberal democracy indicates 
that the values of democracy are not internalized in the actors like they are in fully 
consolidated democracies.  
4.3 
                                             
Tolerance toward Religious Minorities 
Historically Poland has been more religiously diverse than it is today, and 
Weclawowicz (1996:152) estimates that in 1939 minorities made up about 35 percent 
of the population. The majority of non-Catholic inhabitants were German, Jews, 
Belarusian and Ukrainian. The redrawing of borders after World War II made Poland 
relatively homogeneous, and the current number of the population belonging to a 
minority group is small7 (Anderson 2003b:85).  
In communist Poland the image of a united nation was very important. This meant 
that there was no place for internal divisions – such as divisions caused by religious 
minorities. The discourse of national unity dominated the public symbolic world, and 
had the side effect of eliminating several social and cultural issues from the agenda 
 
7 Approximately 3 percent of a population of around 38 millions can be placed in this category. 
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(Mach 1997:6-7). Today, these controversial issues are back on the agenda. The 
minority issue is one of the most important. The Catholic Church enjoyed an 
immense legitimacy, and the minorities feared that their needs and wishes would be 
overlooked. Because of the notion ““Polak = katolik”, religious minority groups in 
Poland feel that the Roman Catholic majority treats them as non-Poles (Holm-Hansen 
1999:115, Nowicka 1997:81-90). 
According to the theory of democratic consolidation, actors in a democratic 
environment will get accustomed to the workings of the regime in a process called 
“taming of politics”. This process leads to more flexible positions which allow 
several views to be presented as reasonable options. As a result, tolerance of other 
actors’ outlooks prevails in the public discourse. The existence of such a tolerance 
enhances the ability to manage the diversities of opinion caused by religious 
minorities. Political tolerance is commonly defined as a willingness to put up with 
political opponents and out-groups, and how an actor behaves toward minorities is 
generally seen as a good indicator of the level of tolerance (Karpov 1999:389).  
The challenge for religious organizations is to embrace religious freedom, which is 
imperative for the development of mutual tolerance. In Poland, the bishops were 
ambivalent toward the principle of religious freedom. In 1984 the Head of the Polish 
Church, Primate Glemp wrote an introduction to Roman Dmowski’s 1927 pamphlet 
Church, Nation and State expressing his preference for a confessional Catholic state. 
Four years later, in 1988, an internal document of the Polish Episcopate was leaked to 
the press. In it Primate Glemp argued against the principle of religious freedom. Like 
the traditionalists at the Vatican II Council he said that the Church can not tolerate 
falsehood or recognize that error has the same rights as truth (Casanova 1994:110). 
The reluctance of the head of the Polish Catholic Church to tolerate that other groups 
have other views, is a potential problem in the Episcopate’s relationship toward 
religious minorities.  
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4.3.1 Relationship with the Jewish Minority 
Before World War II, one of the most important sources of anti-Semitism in Poland 
could be found in the teachings of the Catholic Church, and in the thoughts of the 
main ideologue supporting the Church; Roman Dmowski (Korbonski 2000a:134, 
Walicki 2000). But by the mid-1980s, there were signs of reconciliation. The 
Episcopate established a special commission for dialogue with Jews, and in 1983, on 
the 40th anniversary of the Warsaw ghetto uprising, Primate Glemp participated in a 
memorial service for the Jewish victims. This was the first time in history a Polish 
bishop prayed for the Jews (Korbonski 2000a:134). 
In post-communist Poland there have been incidences where representatives of the 
Episcopate have shown anti-Semitic tendencies, but these statements have not been 
officially supported. One incident occurred in 1995 when Reverend Jankowski 
declared in President Walesa’s presence that Poland “could no longer tolerate a rule 
by individuals who did not tell whether they came from Moscow or from Israel”. 
Reverend Jankowski is one of the earliest supporters of Solidarity in Gdansk, and was 
at the time a close confidant of President Walesa. Reverend Jankowski followed up 
the statement by comparing the Star of David to “the symbols of swastika and 
hammer and sickle”, and asserted that the Jews were “responsible for the birth of 
communism and the outbreak of World War II” (Korbonski 2000a:135).  
To make matters worse, the sermon was delivered during a Festival of Jewish 
Culture, staged to encourage dialogue between Christians and Jews. The highly 
negative reaction, both in Poland and abroad, led to the Episcopate’s condemnation 
of Jankowski. This reaction, however, did not discourage Jankowski, and during the 
1997 election campaign he claimed that there was no room for Jews in the new 
government; an obvious attack on Foreign Minister Geremek. After this controversial 
event, Jankowski was suspended for a year by the Archbishop of Gdansk (Korbonski 
2000a:135). The suspension of Jankowski shows the limit of what the Episcopate 
accepts when its members show intolerance toward religious minorities. Even if the 
bishops were reluctant to act against Father Jankowski at first, the highly negative 
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reaction from the democratic environment did not permit these incidences to be 
ignored. It seemed like the democratic environment pressured the Episcopate to alter 
its behavior, and act to hinder intolerance against religious minorities.  
This behavior can be seen even if the head of the Episcopate, Primate Glemp, was, or 
at least had been, skeptical to the principle of religious freedom. This fact may 
indicate that if the Episcopate did not feel any pressure toward acting according to 
democratic values, the actor would have ignored Revered Jankowski’s behavior. 
Since this was not the case, the theory of democratic consolidation is strengthened 
because it predicts that the strategy of the Episcopate is formed by the democratic 
context. In this example, it seems like the democratic context exercise enough 
pressure to force the Episcopate to pay more attention to democratic values, although 
it may do so reluctantly.  
Another aspect of the Church’s relationship with the Jewish minority concerns Radio 
Maryja. Radio Maryja is situated in the town of Torun. It broadcasts masses and 
services in addition to conducting interviews with pro-Church politicians and other 
actors who sympathize with the Church’s stances in issues of current interest. The 
station has around 5 million listeners, and has successfully spread simplistic and 
fundamentalist Catholic viewpoints. The station has had a rapidly increasing political 
influence, and works for “integrism”, a soft form of confessional state (Riishøj 
1997:17).  
Mach (2000:12) states that the Episcopate several times has distanced itself from 
Radio Maryja, especially when the station broadcasted anti-Semitic programs. 
Korbonski (2000a:131) stresses that the Episcopate was concerned with the 
increasingly controversial tone of the transmissions. This led to that both Primate 
Glemp and the Secretary General of the Episcopate, Bishop Pieronek, openly 
criticized Father Rydzyk, the head of the radio station (Grzybowski and Mikuli 
2004:202, Korbonski 2000a:131, Mach 2000:12). The Episcopate’s attitude toward 
Radio Maryja indicates that the hierarchy did not tolerate direct assaults on religious 
minorities. Even if Radio Maryja had a large group of listeners, the Episcopate did 
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not want to be associated with this radio station. On the contrary, the Episcopate 
openly criticized its simplistic and fundamentalist viewpoints, and thereby reaffirmed 
its commitment to tolerance of religious minorities.  
In this example, it may seem like the Episcopate moderate its stances against the 
more fundamentalist Radio Maryja. This moderation of fundamentalist viewpoints 
supports Sartori’s notion of “the taming of politics”, and may make it easier for the 
Episcopate to reach compromises with the Jews in the future. Since the Episcopate 
seem to move closer to not looking at itself as involved in a zero-sum conflict, it 
becomes easier for the actor to focus on compromise, tolerance of others’ viewpoints, 
and consensus-building in its strategy. The focus on compromise, tolerance and 
consensus-building may also be seen in the ecumenical cooperation between the two 
denominations. The Polish Council of Christians and Jews meets regularly to discuss 
issues of common interest, an action which underlines the Episcopate’s commitment 
toward increasing the level of religious tolerance (US Department of State 2002). 
In conclusion, the Polish Episcopate has emphasized tolerance in its relationship with 
the Jewish minority. It did not accepted breaches of this tolerance from its members, 
or from other actors like Radio Maryja. The Episcopate has thus supported religious 
freedom in spite of the fact that Cardinal Glemp repeatedly criticized this principle in 
the late 1980s. Consequently, the events give support to the theory of democratic 
consolidation because it seems like the democratic environment has pressured the 
Polish Episcopate to emphasize tolerance in its behavior.  
4.3.2 Relationship with the Orthodox Minority  
The borderlands conjoining Poland and Belarus can be seen as frontiers between two 
major civilizations – the Roman Catholic Western Christianity and the Orthodox 
Eastern Christianity. Poles have traditionally seen themselves and their country as 
“the last outpost of western civilization”. The notion of Poland as the bulwark or 
antemurale against outside threats has existed since AD 1000, and is still held by 
many of the borderland citizens (Davies 1981:159). The notion underlines the 
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differences between the two groups, and can serve to deepen the conflicts. The 
polarization between the Catholics and the Orthodox was reinforced with the 
revitalization of the Polish Catholic Church in the post-1989 period (Holm-Hansen 
1999:13-14).   
The Orthodox Poles, a community of around 500 000 members, often complained 
about the new Catholic force, and found it menacing to their community (Ramet 
1991:259, Weclawowicz 1996:10). Several incidents underlined the Orthodox fear of 
the consequences of Catholic chauvinism. A series of arson attacks against Orthodox 
Church’s property occurred; a fire at the home of Dr. Marian Bendza, professor of 
Orthodox Church history, on June 23, 1990, a fire at the Orthodox convent at 
Grabarka in northeastern Poland on the night of July 12, 1990, and three arson attacks 
on the Trinity Church under construction in Bialystok during the same period (Ramet 
1991:259-260). These incidents can of course not be blamed on the Polish 
Episcopate, but they indicate the level of tension and hostility between the members 
of the two different denominations.  
In the post-communist era, the Polish Roman Catholic Church in north-east Poland 
has conducted electoral campaigns by distributing leaflets outside churches on 
Sundays. The local churches often support local national-conservative candidates 
from the Post-Solidarity camp, and in an inadequately disguised manner. This 
political practice has been followed up by the Orthodox Church, and is leading to a 
more polarized situation (Holm-Hansen 1999:124). In this example, the strategy of 
the Church does not show a “taming of politics”; the Roman Catholic Church did not 
focus on compromise and consensus-building in its relationship with the Orthodox 
Church.  
On the other hand, neither did the Orthodox Church. As a consequence, the 
relationship was based on mutual distrust, and it was difficult for both Churches to 
take the first step toward reconciliation. On the other hand, the Catholic and 
Orthodox Churches do have an active bilateral commission which exists to promote 
and encourage dialogue between the two denominations (US Department of State 
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2002). Hence, the situation is not completely deadlocked, and it is possible to see the 
will to engage in dialogue on both sides. It can thus be hypothesized that the actors do 
not see themselves as participating in a zero-sum conflict, and compromises and 
consensus-building seem to be a potential strategy for the Polish Episcopate in its 
relationship with the Orthodox minority. Since the Episcopate seemed to consider 
this strategy, a “taming of politics” may be slowly occurring. 
Anderson (2003b:88) states that there have been several reports telling that local 
religious and political authorities made it hard for the Orthodox community to find 
places for worship. One example of local hostility is the restitution of a monastery in 
Suprasl outside Bialystok in north-east Poland. Despite the fact that Pope John Paul 
himself suggested that the former monastery should be returned to the Orthodox 
Church, the case caused a considerable stir For the Catholic nationalists the handing 
over of this property in Suprasl was a tragedy. The Roman Catholic Curia in 
Bialystok expressed its disappointment in an official letter that was read aloud in all 
the churches in the region. The letter stated that what was witnessed was “the true 
face of Orthodox Chauvinists and Russian nationalists” (Holm-Hansen 1999:134-
135). The statement of the Curia in Bialystok emphasized the prejudices which make 
it harder to find common solutions. Orthodox Poles are equaled to “Russian 
nationalists”, a term with few positive connotations in post-communist Poland. As a 
consequence, the Church’s attitude toward the Orthodox minority in this case did not 
promote a “taming of politics”. 
The attitude of the Bialystok Curia was ignored by the central actors inside the 
Episcopate. It seems that in situations where the pressure from the democratic 
environment is low, and when the issue is not on the national or international political 
agenda, the Episcopate could more freely choose not to act according to the norms of 
democracy. In this example, the absence of a strong democratic context allowed the 
Episcopate to ignore intolerance within its own ranks. In the Jewish example, the 
strong reactions from the democratic context made this strategy an impossible choice 
for the Episcopate.    
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Orthodox minority representatives argued strongly for a formal separation of Church 
and state in the Constitution because of the fear of state-backed national Catholicism 
(Anderson 2003a:146). In the debate on the constitution in 1995, bishop Pieronek 
replied: “Do you expect 95 percent of the nation to keep quiet because 5 percent want 
to have their constitution? Don’t we have rights? We are guided by the concern for 
our common good. If we say that the Church is the community of the faithful, then it 
totals 95 percent of the nation” (Ramet 1997:105). Bishop Pieronek’s statement is 
not consistent with the Episcopate’s skepticism to liberal democracy based on its 
possibility to exploit majority rule that was underlined in section 4.2. In this 
statement, Pieronek expresses the opposite view of what he stated about majority rule 
applied in moral issues. Here, it seems like the bare fact that Poland has an 
overwhelming Catholic majority justifies that the rights of the minorities are 
overlooked in the constitution. It seems like the strategy of the Episcopate is 
governed by the actor’s interests on the different issues, and not by the values 
described by the theory of democratic consolidation.  
4.4 Chapter review 
4.4.1 Strategy toward the Ideological Challenge of Democracy 
The ideological challenge must be faced by all religious organizations operating in a 
democracy, but there are several approaches to it. Examples of relatively 
accommodating approaches can be found in Ireland and Spain, while the Polish 
Episcopate seems to have chosen a more confrontational line. This line can be seen in 
the Episcopate’s approach to liberal democracy. The official statements of the 
Episcopate compare liberalism to “a new form of totalitarianism, intolerant of good”, 
and later the official statements accuse liberalism of “attempts to blur differences 
between good and evil”. The hostile tone indicates that a “taming of politics” is yet to 
happen in this area, and the values of compromise, tolerance and consensus-building 
are not dominating aspects of the strategy. 
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The Episcopate’s attitude toward minority rights in the constitution is also striking. 
When minority representatives express their fear of being overrun by the Catholic 
majority, bishop Pieronek replies that the Church community equals 95 percent of the 
population. This seems to imply that these 95 percent has the right to ignore the last 5 
percent of the population. On moral issues on the other hand, which other European 
Catholic countries have solved by majority rule, the Episcopate rules out a solution 
by democratic means. It therefore seems that the Episcopate did not emphasize 
compromises in its strategy here, and by consequence it politics have not been 
“tamed”.   
4.4.2 The Impact of Democratic Context 
In the first empirical example one can see a clear skepticism in the Episcopate toward 
liberal democracy. It can be hypothesized that the democratic pressure in this 
situation is too weak to make an impact. Since Poland is a young democracy, it is 
possible that the environment does not pressure the actors as much as the theory of 
democratic consolidation predicts.  
From the Episcopate’s strategy toward religious minorities, a theoretical assumption 
can be made. It can be hypothesized that the stronger the pressure from the 
democratic environment, the more likely it is that the Episcopate’s behavior is in line 
with the core values of democratic consolidation. This is underlined in the 
Episcopate’s behavior toward the Jewish minority versus toward the Orthodox 
minority. In the Jewish example, both the national and the international democratic 
pressure were high, and in this situation the Episcopate’s behavior was formed by the 
contextual pressure. In the Orthodox example, on the other hand, the democratic 
pressure was nearly absent; a situation which allowed the Episcopate not to act when 
intolerance was expressed within their ranks. 
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5. The Social Challenge of Democracy 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Traditionally and today, the Catholic churches have “a well-defined social teaching, 
[and] pay close attention to public policy formation, especially on moral issues” 
(Enyedi 2003:222). Consistent with the emphasis on societal issues, Cardinal Glemp 
declared in September 1990: “Religion is no private affair, it concerns the whole 
society” (Ramet 1991:256). The focus on religious issues in contemporary debates in 
post-communist Poland’s politics reinforced the Episcopate’s role in public policy 
formation. One of the most controversial questions was the issue of abortion. The 
Church played an important role in this salient debate, and the question was even 
included in the presidential and parliamentary campaigns during most of the decade. 
Also the broader question of the proper role of the Church in civil society and in 
politics was thoroughly discussed; one of the most important issues in the debate was 
religious instruction in public schools (Michta 1997:90).  
In moral debates, the Polish Episcopate promoted the traditional Christian values. An 
interpretation of the Church’s vision of the Polish moral community is given by 
Hockenos (1993: 250): “Their mission is the rebirth of the Polish nation, at the 
cornerstone of which lies the traditional, close-knit family: a hard-working, 
dedicated father, a devoted housewife and mother, and respectful God-fearing 
children.” The Episcopate’s image of society collides with the image that is 
promoted by the secularization theory. Secularization, which is most pronounced in 
West-European democracies, constitute a challenge to religious organizations; the 
social challenge. The theory of secularization predicts that the values promoted by the 
Polish Episcopate are increasingly displaced by other and more secular ones.  
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The process of secularization is generally seen as a product of the Enlightenment. 
The Enlightenment challenged the Christian worldview, and stated that prejudice and 
superstition were by-products of religious beliefs. Therefore, one of the goals of the 
period was to weaken the control exercised by the Church over public moral and 
education (Girvin 2000:9). According to Sartori (1995:105), secularization is a 
necessary condition for the “taming of politics”: “Secularization occurs when the 
realm of God and the realm of Caesar – the sphere of religion and the sphere politics 
– are separated. As a result, politics are no longer reinforced by religion: it loses 
both its religion-derived rigidity (dogmatism) and its religion-like intensity. Out of 
this situation arise the conditions for the taming of politics”. 
Even if large majorities of European populations still profess basic believes in God, 
participation in public acts of worship has dropped to low levels in most countries. In 
Poland, together with Ireland and Italy, participation remains relatively high, but it is 
nevertheless declining (Crouch 2000:90). According to Soper and Fetzer (2002:169), 
it is in situations when outside values – like secular values – threaten a religious 
community that disputes over religious issues are most likely to arise. The clashes 
between traditional Catholic values and more secular values have been visible in the 
Polish society, and a look into these conflicts can give an indicator on how the Polish 
Episcopate has handled the social challenge of democracy.  
5.2 Abortion  
Poland, along with the other Eastern bloc countries, had a very liberal abortion law 
during communist rule. Abortion was available on demand, and was used as a means 
of birth control (Korbonski 2000a:127). This liberal practice was not in line with the 
teachings of the Catholic Church: “From the moment of its conception life must be 
guarded with the greatest care, while abortion and infanticide are unspeakable 
crimes”. This quotation is taken from the Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the 
Modern World drafted by the Second Vatican Council in 1965 (Cap 2004:1). 
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Because the Church saw an opportunity to influence the law in the new democratic 
setting, abortion has been on the political agenda in Poland throughout the period 
investigated in this thesis (Anderson 2003a:149, Morawska 1995:62-63). The 
Episcopate wanted an absolute constitutional ban against abortion in post-communist 
Poland. Their preferred version of the abortion law made all termination of pregnancy 
illegal, and both woman and doctor would be subject to two years imprisonment. 
Exceptions could only be made if the woman’s life was in danger, and not in cases of 
rape or incest (Byrnes 2001:31, Hockenos 1993:249).    
The Episcopate’s stance on the abortion issue has led to an increased effort to try to 
influence politics. Politics in Poland in the post-communist era has been marked by 
instable party formations on the clerical right, where the Church has its political 
allies. Despite this fact, the views and values of the Church have enjoyed 
considerable political backing, and some political parties have constantly supported 
politics that promote the Church’s social teachings in society (Holm-Hansen 
2002:98-99). Because of the continued political support, the Church has been able to 
become a potent political actor in the moral debate.   
5.2.1 The Passing of a Restricted Abortion Law 
The Episcopate’s attitudes toward moral issues encourage it to take actively part in 
the formulation of policy. Catholic doctrine has, as mentioned, been a vital part of 
political programs, especially on the political right, and the Church’s support has 
been of profound value to parties with a Christian national character. This was 
especially true for the Christian National Union (ZChN)8, first a part of the Catholic 
Election Action (WAK)9, and then later the same decade a part of the Solidarity 
Trade Union (AWS)10 (Chan 2000:186). The Episcopate has consistently offered 
                                              
8 Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe 
9 Wyborcza Akcja Katolicka 
10 Akcja Wyborcza Solidarności. 
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backing to these coalitions to create political support for the Church’s interests 
(Anderson 2003a:147). This tendency has been reinforced by the phenomenon of 
politicization of morality, a tendency which has been striking in Polish politics in the 
period investigated in this thesis (Szajkowski 1997:164).  
An example of the Church’s active political role was given in the 1991 election 
campaign. Before the election, the Episcopate asked the believers to vote for 
candidates who were “wise and trustworthy, competent, in favor of Christian ethics 
and values and willing to promote them in Parliament, ready to serve the common 
good, as well as those who safeguard and maintain Polish identity and its Christian 
values”. At the same time, the bishops warned against “egoists, careerists, power-
seekers, corrupted and amoral politicians, and advocates of the separation of Church 
and state” (Chan 2000:187). Before the election, the actor proclaimed that it was 
politically neutral, but the former statement showed a clear support for the national-
clerical parties (Grabowska 1994:260). By instructing the voters in this way, the 
Episcopate used their political influence to gain an opportunity to change societal 
issues (Morawska 1995:63). Primate Glemp was a frequent and visible visitor to both 
houses of parliament. The Primate also used the Catholic media to express his views 
on the abortion issue, and some bishops summoned Polish top politicians to personal 
meetings in order to influence their stance on the abortion issue (Hockenos 
1993:248). 
The Episcopate chose to emphasize its traditional core supporters in its strategy. In a 
society which contains over 90 percent Catholics, the Episcopate may have lost the 
ability to represent Catholics who do not vote for the parties on the clerical right. The 
Polish Episcopate’s strategy is contrasted by the commonly chosen strategy of 
religious organizations in West-European democracies. These organizations tend to 
choose a more neutral political strategy, and do not tell the believers for which parties 
they are supposed to vote. The West-European strategy often emphasizes that 
religious organizations are open to all believers independently of the attitudes in 
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specific questions; whether political or moral (Anderson 2003a, Cap 2004, Madeley 
2003).  
By choosing its allies among the political actors who emphasized traditional values, 
the Episcopate may have narrowed its appeal in more liberal Catholic groups, but the 
strategy was successful in turning traditional Catholic values into real politics. The 
Catholic Election Action gained enough seats in the highly fragmented 1991 Sejm to 
be an attractive partner in government, and the ZChN formed part of the governments 
of Jan Olszewski11 and Hanna Suchocka12 (Korbonski 2000a:139). The strategy 
chosen by the Episcopate on the abortion issue seemed to be more focused on policy 
results than on compromise and consensus-building. The Polish bishops called the 
prevention of abortion the sine qua non of the preservation of the Polish nation, and 
the Episcopate sent an open memorandum to parliament encouraging “perseverance 
and courage in seeking legal measures to secure the life of each conceived child” 
(Morawska 1995:63).  
The Episcopate also issued a communiqué refusing parliament “the moral right to 
vote against a law granting respect for Christian values in public life” (Korbonski 
2000a:127, Morawska 1995:63). This statement was followed up by political 
declarations in local sermons. The Sejm deputies who had openly declared their 
opposition to the anti-abortion bill were criticized in masses conducted in their 
electoral districts. This was a powerful means considering that church attendance was 
very high at that time13 (Zielinska 2000:36-37). In a democratic setting, religious 
organizations are allowed to argue their case in public debates, but mixing politics 
and religion in masses is commonly regarded as an unfortunate mix. In democracies it 
is normally agreed that the focus in masses should be on Christian worship, and not 
                                              
11 Prime Minister in Poland from December 1991 to June 1992. 
12 Prime Minister in Poland from July 1992 to September 1993. 
13 In a study carried out by the CBOS polling center in 1991, 51 percent of Poles describe themselves as “regularly 
practicing Catholics”, 30 percent as “occasionally practicing”, 12 percent as “non-practicing believers” and 1 percent as 
“non-believing churchgoers”. 
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on political issues. Hence, to explicitly state how believers should vote is not seen as 
an issue in which Church leaders have a natural authority. These leaders are rather 
seen as sources of inspiration on certain issues, but not as vote instructors to the 
religious community.  
In its anti-abortion rhetoric, the Church upheld the confrontational style from 
communist times (Korbonski 2000a:128). The bishops developed a discourse which 
equaled abortion with killing. Those who supported liberalization were portrayed as 
enemies of the Polish nation, and as communists, because it was the communist 
regime which had introduced the previous liberal law (Mach 2000:11). According to 
the theory of democratic consolidation, the democratic context will “tame politics”. 
In the abortion example, the assumption does not seem to be supported by the 
empirical evidence. The Church sustained a strategy which focused on division rather 
than compromise, and therefore a “taming of politics” did not seem to have taken 
place.  
The polarizating language is visible in Solidarity Senator Kaczynski’s statement 
during the early phase of the abortion debate: “All good Poles are against abortion. 
Those in favor are an evil part of the nation” (Anderson 2003b:172). This statement 
showed that the notion of division into good and evil segments of society was still 
alive in Polish politics. This may indicate that the context in Poland not always has 
the possibility to exercise democratic pressure. On the contrary, vital actors in the 
context support the Episcopate’s black-and-white thinking.      
The Episcopate, together with political sympathizers, finally mobilized enough 
support in the Sejm to pass an anti-abortion law on January 7, 1993. The full name of 
the law was the Law on Family Planning, Legal Protection of the Fetus and the 
Conditions of Permissibility of Abortion, and it became effective on March 16, 1993 
(Korbonski 2000a:127, Zielinska 2000:31). The abortion law allowed interruption of 
pregnancy in only a few cases; incest, rape, fetal deformity, or threat to the mother’s 
life or physical health, and it introduced fines and prison terms for doctors who 
disobeyed the law (Korbonski 2000a:127).  
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Cardinal Glemp saw the passing of this bill as a step closer to the goal of a total ban 
on abortion, consistent with the Church’s social teaching (Casanova 1994:111, 
Szajkowski 1997:163). Commenting on the law, bishop Pieronek stated that the 
Catholic Church was unhappy with the law in its current form because the principle 
“Thou shall not kill” allowed no exceptions (Morawska 1995:63). The Polish 
Episcopate insisted that restricted access to abortion was a prerequisite of an 
effectively free and authentically Polish nation. Since the liberal abortion legislation 
had been imposed during the communist days, a free and Catholic Poland should 
assert its independence by placing strict limits on this practice (Byrnes 2002:39).  
Even if most of the Poles did not want a stricter abortion law14, the Church hierarchy 
defined it as the national interest. During the abortion controversy, there was a major 
effort to have a referendum, and close to one million signatures were collected. In 
1991, 75 percent favored a referendum on the issue (Chan 2000:180, Ramet 
1997:99). The Episcopate opposed the idea knowing that public opinion surveys 
showed that the people were in favor of the liberal version of the law. At the end the 
Solidarity-dominated parliament disregarded the demand to consult the Polish 
population and the law was passed with a slim majority (Korbonski 2000a:127-128). 
Zielinska (2000:33) elaborates on the Episcopate’s stance: “The Church has always 
steadfastly opposed a vote on a moral issue, claiming this to be “not only anti-
Christian, but anti-Polish and inhuman as well””. Eberts (1998:824) holds the same 
opinion, and comments: “The most profoundly anti-democratic stand taken by the 
Church with respect to abortion was its firm opposition to a proposed referendum on 
the issue in 1991. The Episcopate strongly objected to the idea, arguing that the right 
to life could never be subjected to people’s opinion”. Even if the Episcopate argued 
against a solution which involved a decision taken by referendum for obvious 
strategic reasons, it did not oppose the vote in parliament. The Episcopate can, 
                                              
14 The views of Polish society on the issue of legal regulation of abortion are quite stable. In the 1990s, half of the 
respondents believed that abortion should be allowed with some restrictions, or without any. A little over a quarter thought 
that abortion should be banned, although they allowed some exceptions, while around 15 percent opted for a strict ban 
(www.cbos.com.pl). 
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according to democratic norms, participate in debates on the use of democratic rules, 
and freely express its opinions on the issue. It was democratically elected 
representatives who made the decision not to have a referendum. As a consequence, 
this thesis argues that the stance chosen by the Episcopate regarding an abortion 
referendum was more tactical than anti-democratic. The Episcopate did not question 
the democratic procedures in themselves; it argued for the solution within the 
democratic framework that served its interests in the best way.  
5.2.2 The Maintenance of a Restricted Abortion Law 
The reformed communists won the election in 1993, and the Democratic Left 
Alliance15(SLD) and Agrarian Party16 (PSL) formed a coalition government. 
Traditionally, the leftist side in Poland has not been close to the Church, but attempts 
of conciliation were stressed by the PSL’s leader Pawlak. Both his participation in 
Catholic festivities and his pilgrimage to the Holy Virgin of Czestochowa underlined 
the government’s accommodating approach toward the Church. Pawlak’s friendly 
attitude toward the Church was also stressed by the frequent praise of Catholic social 
doctrine, and has been welcomed by the Episcopate (Held 1996:193). Again the 
support for the Church’s views is observable in the context, a fact which reduces the 
context’s possibility to pressure the Episcopate when the values of compromise, 
tolerance and consensus-building are not focused on in its strategy. This in turn 
decreases the pace of the democratic consolidation process. 
In spite of this conciliating tone toward the bishops’ hierarchy, the government used 
their newly won support to pass a more liberal abortion law in 1993. In 1994, the law 
was vetoed by President Walesa. Walesa is a known promoter of Christian values in 
politics, and has been one of the Church’s most important partners in the battle 
against more secular forces. When vetoing the law, Walesa argued: “No economic 
                                              
15 Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej. 
16 Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe. 
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barriers can legalize assassination of a human life, especially personal conditions of 
a woman, which cannot be objectively verified” (Eberts 1998:825). The support of a 
vital actor for the Church’s uncompromising strategy in the Polish context is again 
visible.  
Walesa’s stance was supported by the Pope later that year. In Evangelium Vitae (The 
Gospel of Life), the Pope warned: “I declare that direct abortion, that is abortion 
willed as an end or as a means, always constitutes a grave moral disorder, since it is 
the deliberate killing of an innocent human being”. Pieronek supports the papal 
attitude: “The Church can not say that abortion is not a crime because that is what it 
is. The Church has the duty to tell what is evil, and what is good” (Ramet 1997:100, 
109).  
Poland changed presidents after the election in 1995, and Aleksander Kwasniewski 
from SLD was chosen over Lech Walesa. Because of this shift, the liberal version of 
the abortion bill was passed in parliament once again, and this time it was signed by 
the President in November 1996 (Byrnes 2002:39-40, Chan 2000:183). The 
ratification of the bill was obviously a huge disappointment to the Episcopate, and the 
decision was deeply criticized by the institution. Glemp, the head of the Episcopate, 
insisted that “there can be no place at the altar for people who say “yes” to death” 
(Zielinska 2000:37). Glemp’s statement again underlines that the Episcopate is not 
willing to compromise on this issue.  
Bishop Pieronek also commented on the law: “This decision is participation in a 
crime. It is a horrible thing to observe people who for months on end, in cold blood, 
plan the murder of hundreds of thousands of human beings. I would not hesitate to 
call this a crime against humanity” (Eberts 1998:825, Zielinska 2000:37). He further 
stated that “this law is unethical, and therefore, in terms of conscience, it is not in 
force”. Ramet (1997:105) comments on this statement and says that is seems like the 
Catholic Church in Poland claimed a right to veto the decision of the majority. 
Bishop Pieronek stated that such a law is not in force, an announcement which 
showed an anti-democratic potential in the Episcopate. Even if the result is decided 
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democratically, the Church underlined what it stated in its approach to the ideological 
challenge; some decisions can not be taken by majority rule. The declaration also 
shows the Episcopate’s inconsistent approach to democracy; democracy is tolerated 
when the outcomes are in line with the Episcopate’s wishes, and criticized when the 
results clashes with the viewpoints of the same institution. The inconsistent attitude 
of the Episcopate indicates that “the taming of politics” has not yet happened. 
In a letter to the Episcopate, the Pope expressed his disappointment: “The Church in 
Poland is in mourning because of the criminal law approved by the Sejm” (Eberts 
1998:825). The Pope further stated that “A nation which kills its own children is a 
nation without a future. There is no rule of law in a state which permits the murder of 
innocents” (Zielinska 2000:37). There were broad clerical protestations against the 
law, and the clergy mobilized to show their dissatisfaction. Of the most extreme 
protestations was the Christmas cradle in St. Joseph’s Church in Torun in 1996; 
instead of baby Jesus, there were gynecological tools in the cradle (Eberts 1998:825).  
In December 1996, a month after the bill was passed, the new law was referred to the 
Constitutional tribunal by a group of Sejm deputies (Chan 2000:184). On 28 May 
1997, the Tribunal ruled that five of the articles were unconstitutional, including the 
provision allowing women to obtain abortions for material or personal reasons 
(Eberts 1998:826).  The Constitutional Tribunal declared that the law also lacked 
clarity and conformity with the human life protections of the new Constitution 
(Byrnes 2002:39-40). The Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling on this issue said that to 
allow abortion for social reasons contradicted what it saw as the principle of “the 
democratic state ruled by law”. The Tribunal stated that a democratic state ruled by 
law implied that life must be protected at all stages. The Tribunal further declared 
that a woman’s right to decide about reproduction is valid only until conception 
(Chan 2000:184, Zielinska 2000:33). Zielinska (2000) comments that it had by then 
become clear that the Constitutional Tribunal supported anti-abortion measures, even 
at the expense of its professional reputation. Brzezinski (2000:176) agrees, and states 
that the Constitutional Tribunal, “when addressing particularly contentious 
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constitutional questions”, at times seemed to bow to political expedience at the 
expense of constitutional coherence. 
After the declaration of the Tribunal, Bishop Pieronek expressed his satisfaction and 
exclaimed that he “felt safer in Poland” (Eberts 1998:826). Subsequent to this ruling, 
SLD deputies proposed a referendum on the issue, but the proposal was rejected by 
170 to 165 votes in the Sejm, with 26 abstentions (Chan 2000:184). As a result, the 
1993 abortion restrictions are still valid (Eberts 1998:826).   
5.3 Religious instruction  
Shortly after the fall of communism, the Episcopate engaged in a campaign to 
reintroduce religious education in public schools (Korbonski 2000a:125). The law on 
religious education was passed right after the collapse of communism, and was 
criticized for the manner in which it was approved. The issue of religious instruction 
had been a source of conflict throughout the communist period, but just before the 
communist collapse the question appeared to be solved. Religious classes were 
offered on a regular basis, but these classes were not part of the official curriculum 
and took place outside the schools (Korbonski 2000a:125). 
The new 1990 regulations said that all public schools should permit the Catholic 
Church, or other interested churches and religious organizations, to offer religion 
classes in state schools. Parents had to declare that they wished their children to 
participate (Brzezinski 2000:179). Because the law had been introduced without 
parliamentary debate, the ombudsman, Ewa Letowska, asked for a ruling on the 
legality of the matter from the Constitutional Tribunal. Letowska questioned the fact 
that the 1990 regulations had been introduced by administrative fiat; on such a 
controversial issue it would have been more appropriate to involve parliament, she 
argued (Anderson 2003b:78, Casanova 1994:111). 
The Tribunal ruled in favor of the Ministry of Education on January 30, 1991 and 
found that no irregularities had been conducted (Eberts 1998:822, Korbonski 
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2000a:125).  The Tribunal also ruled that religious education did not contradict the 
separation of church and state because the state was not actually administrating the 
education (Anderson 2003b:78). Brzezinski (2000:178) questions this ruling. He 
states that “in several politically weighty cases the Tribunal has departed from its 
usual strict standards of independence for the sake of political expediency”, and 
further describes this ruling in 1990 as an example of this tendency. As in the 
abortion issue, vital actors in the context agreed with the Episcopate’s stance. This 
holds true even if the manner in which the regulations where introduced can be 
questioned for its democratic spirit. Consequently, the potential of the context to 
pressure the Episcopate probably diminishes because the contextual pressure is no 
longer unambiguously pro-democratic.  
In 1991, the new Minister of Education originated a new Law on the Educational 
System, a law which favored the wishes of the Catholic Church. In the following 
debate, the Episcopate publicly insulted and reprimanded those who contested the 
provisions. An example of the Episcopate’s hostile behavior toward its opponents 
occurred when students demonstrated against some of the new regulations. These 
regulations introduced prayers before and after classes, and demanded written 
declarations from parents on their children’s participation, or non-participation, in 
religious instruction. The Episcopate’s press spokesman commented on the 
demonstration calling the students involved “the sons and daughters of Russian 
officers”, which in 1991 was equal to national traitors (Morawska 1995:62).  
The 1991 regulations were again challenged by the new ombudsman and Chief 
Arbiter of Civil Rights, Professor Tadeusz Zielinski. The Church’s attack was led by 
Glemp, who wanted to oust the ombudsman because “he did not represent the will of 
the nation” (Korbonski 2000a:126). Glemp’s proclamation reflected the Church’s 
role as the defender of the Polish nation under communism. This role did not fit as 
well in the new democratic context as in the autocratic one, but the notion appeared 
to be important in forming the Episcopate’s strategy also in the new context. Actors 
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who did not agree with the Episcopate’s stance, where often defined as traitors 
against the nation.  
The Constitutional Court pronounced half of the 1991 laws unconstitutional in April 
1993. Cardinal Glemp, head of the Episcopate, compared the Tribunal’s proceedings 
to a circus when commenting on the issue (Korbonski 2000a:126, Morawska 
1995:62). Cardinal Glemp’s attitude showed the Episcopate’s pragmatic approach 
toward democracy. When the Constitutional Tribunal can be used to promote the 
Episcopate’s stance, as in the abortion issue, it is tolerated, but the same institution is 
harshly criticized if it goes against the will of the bishops.  
The introduction of religious education in 1991 worried the member churches of the 
Polish Ecumenical Council. The minority churches claimed that non-Catholic 
children would inevitably become victims of discrimination because of the new law 
(Ramet 1991:253). After the law was introduced, it was demonstrated that the 
criticism was partly justified; in the east of Poland some local and Church authorities 
acted in ways that discriminated against the Orthodox minority – and its rights on the 
issue (Anderson 2003a: 147). 
In rural areas there were considerable pressures on the parents to let their children 
participate in Catholic-run classes (Anderson 2003a:149). In some local communities, 
priests called parents of children who did not attend religious lessons “not good 
Christians”, and by implication, not good Poles (Morawska 1995:62). This can be 
seen as a consequence of the notion Katolik=polak. This is a widespread idea, and it 
is feared because of its lack of tolerance toward dissenters. The idea can lead to 
increased social polarization, and therefore the actual implementation of this idea 
obstructs the “taming of politics” process. 
The Minister of Education, Stelmachowski, commented on the issue of religious 
instruction in 1992: “The rights of the minorities must be guaranteed, but a situation 
cannot arise where sensitivity toward minorities paralyses the rights of the majority” 
(Eberts 1998:822). This quotation shows that the Episcopate was not the only actor in 
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post-communist Poland that was skeptical to majority rule. As previously pointed out, 
this probably leads to a weaker democratic pressure from the context.  
Still, in practice parents may request classes in any of the legally registered religions, 
and such non-Catholic classes did exist. But even if children are supposed to have the 
choice between religious instruction and ethics, the ombudsman’s office states that 
most schools do not offer ethic courses due to financial constraints (US Department 
of State 2002). According to Polish law, religious instruction is voluntary, but the 
Episcopate insisted that the grades received should be made part of the official school 
certificates, a demand which was granted by the authorities in September 1997 
(Korbonski 2000a:126-127). The ability of the Polish Episcopate to influence politics 
may be due to the high-profiled political role of the Church before and during the 
communist collapse, and to the many prominent contacts it made with the new elite 
during that time. The power of the Church does also arise from the important place of 
Catholicism in Polish national identity.  
The domination of the Church in religious instruction is striking when it comes to the 
chosen literature and the selection of teachers. The choice of textbooks falls under the 
competence of the Joint Committee of the Government and the Episcopate, but the 
Concordat17 states that “The program of Catholic education, including textbooks, are 
to be prepared by the Church and shown to competent government agencies” 
(Osiatynski 1996:48). The curriculum is to be determined solely by the Church, 
without any consultation with the government. The teachers are appointed by the 
Church, and their professional qualifications are to be regulated by agreements 
between the Episcopate and the government (Eberts 1998:833).  
The Concordat also declares that “In matters concerning teaching religion, teachers 
are subject to rules established by the Church” (Osiatynski 1996:48). In other words, 
on all matters relating to religious instruction the teachers are responsible only to the 
                                              
17 An agreement signed in 1993, and ratified in 1998. 
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Church, and can instruct courses only as long as they have the permission of the local 
bishop to do so (Eberts 1998:833). In May 1996, the Government-Episcopate Joint 
Commission agreed that priests teaching religion should be paid by the state, but 
selected by the Church, and that they should have the same rights and privileges as 
the teachers in other subjects (Anderson 2003a:149, Ramet 1997:101). 
5.4 Chapter review 
5.4.1 Strategy toward the Social Challenge of Democracy 
In a democratic setting, it is important that all views are heard, and it is therefore a 
healthy sign for democratization in Poland that public discourse is free and open, like 
in the abortion debate. The strategy chosen by the Episcopate can be questioned for 
its suitability in a democratic setting because it emphasizes only those believers 
holding the traditional Catholic views, while alienating the more liberal groups. The 
abortion case is special for the Roman Catholic Church because the Vatican II 
Council describes abortion as “an unspeakable crime”, which makes it harder for the 
Church to compromise on this issue. Still, other European countries have chosen a 
more compromising strategy on the issue than the Polish Episcopate (see Anderson 
2003a on Spain, and Cap 2004 on Ireland).  
In both the empirical examples, the Episcopate used a confrontational and polarizing 
tone. On the abortion issue, this can be exemplified by Glemp’s statement: “there can 
be no place at the altar for people who say “yes” to death”. The discourse shows 
little will to compromise, it rather stigmatizes both sides in the debate. Even when the 
strict abortion law was adopted, the Episcopate wanted it to go further in banning 
abortion. As a result, the scope for compromises was practically non-existing. The 
harsh tone of the Episcopate can also be seen in the religious instruction issue. When 
the Church in 1991 met resistance, it reacted with insults and reprimands. It implied 
that those who were opposed to the Church’s wishes where national traitors, and that 
those who did not want to participate in the Catholic instruction were not good Poles. 
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The Episcopate continued to follow a rigid strategy also in the later years of the 
period. In 1997, it insisted that grades achieved in religious instruction should be part 
of the official school certificate even if the instruction was voluntary. With the 
ratification of the Concordat in 1998, the Church also got to choose the books used in 
the instruction. It was decided that teachers were only responsible toward the Church, 
but that they had the same rights as other teachers, and were paid by the state. 
The elements emphasized by the theory of democratic consolidation, which are 
compromise, bargaining and consensus-building, are not prominent in the clerical 
hierarchy’s strategy toward the social challenge. This may be because the hostile 
strategy applied by the Church in both cases was highly effective. In the abortion case 
the Church succeeded in implementing a stricter law. On the issue of religious 
instruction, the Episcopate was also successful in making its wishes into real policy. 
Therefore, few incentives existed to make the Church change its strategy toward the 
more accommodating approach hypothesized by “the taming of politics”.  
5.4.2 The Impact of Democratic Context  
The process of secularization is supposed to work in the same way as the “taming of 
politics”; it moderates conflicts. In the case of the Polish Episcopate, this does not 
seem to happen. There can be at least two explanations for this. The first is that the 
theory of democratic consolidation is false; there are other factors which explain the 
Episcopate’s choice of strategy. It is outside the scope of the thesis to address these 
possible factors. The other explanation is that the democratic context in Poland has 
not yet developed enough to generate the amount of pressure that is necessary for the 
Episcopate to change its strategy in the direction anticipated by the theory of 
democratic consolidation. In addition, the process of secularization may not be as 
advanced in Poland as it is in Western Europe, and therefore it did not have the same 
effect in moderating conflicts. 
There was a considerable pressure from the context to have a referendum on the 
abortion issue, and over one million signatures where collected. At the same time, the 
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Episcopate had a lot of prominent allies in the environment that supported a stricter 
abortion law. The Constitutional Tribunal and prominent politicians like Kaczynski, 
Walesa and Pawlak all supported the Episcopate’s stance on moral issues. The 
support from other prominent actors in the context probably decreased the democratic 
pressure from the environment.  
 The introduction of religious instruction in public schools caused considerably less 
opposition, and most Poles considered it to be justified and needed. The Church had 
many prominent allies on this issue. The Constitutional Tribunal supported the 
regulations, fully in 1990 and partly in 1993. The minister of Education stressed the 
rights of the Catholic majority in 1992: “The rights of the minorities must be 
guaranteed, but a situation cannot arise where sensitivity toward minorities 
paralyses the rights of the majority”. And the ratification of the Concordat in 1998 
gave the Church significant influence over the selection of teachers and textbooks, 
and the year before grades received in religious instruction were made part of the 
official school certificate. The Church’s strong position on the issue of religious 
instruction shows that the actors in the context were willing to grant the wishes of the 
Church. 
Judging from the empirics, it seems like the theory of democratic consolidation in this 
case needs to be specified in order to predict results. It seems to depend on a certain 
level of democratic pressure from the environment, a pressure which was not present 
in the Polish context. Even if the context is democratic, it does not seem to generate 
an unambiguous democratic pressure.  
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6. The Political Challenge of Democracy 
 
6.1 Introduction 
                                             
The political challenge is about finding a proper role for religious organizations in the 
political framework of a democracy. In Poland, the Church during communism 
helped to unite the opposition to the regime, and therefore developed an image as the 
defender of the Polish national interest. This interest was more focused on what it 
was against – communism, that what it was for, which was harder to define. In post-
communist Poland, the Church kept its image as the defender of the national interest. 
The democratic environment opened for free debate on fundamental issues that 
showed that the national interest was not clear and easy to define. Quite the opposite, 
different actors and segments of the population had fundamentally different views on 
what “the common good” and “the Polish national interest” consisted of. 
The political challenge of democracy takes place at a scene on which the Catholic 
Church does not have so specific guide lines as in social issues. On the contrary, the 
Vatican II Council advises the Church to distance itself from politics. In spite of this, 
the Polish Episcopate chose to have an active role in the constitutional debate, and 
had several demands to the draft committee. Also in the ratification of the 
constitution the Episcopate participated.  
On the controversial issue of the Concordat18, the Episcopate also participated. Both 
during its signing and its ratification the Concordat caused a considerable stir in post-
communist Poland. 
 
18 The agreement regulates the relationship between the Republic of Poland and the Holy See. 
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6.2 
                                             
The Constitutional Debate  
6.2.1 The Drafting Process 
A constitution affects the distribution of power, and each actor wants to ensure that 
their interest will be protected in the constitutional framework of their state. For this 
reason, negotiation and bargaining related to the making of a new constitution is 
normally tough (Leftwich 1997:526). This was also the case in Poland. Since the 
constitution formally defines the Church’s place in the democratic setting, a lot was at 
stake for this actor in the constitutional debate (Eberts 1998:834). The draft 
constitution was narrowly approved in the referendum May 25, 1997. The small 
margin of victory 19 and the low voter turnout20 showed the strength of the Church 
which had conducted a campaign against the draft constitution (Eberts 1998:834, 
Korbonski 2000a:138).  
During the first eight years of the post-communist era, Poland had a “hybrid” 
constitutional framework based on the 1952 Constitution, constitutional amendments 
adopted in 1989-1990, and constitutional legislation from 1992 known as the “Small 
Constitution”. These changes were relatively rapid because of the political consensus 
following the Round Table Agreement, and because the communist deputies in the 
Sejm were eager to show their democratic potential (Batt and Wolczuk 1998:90-91, 
Brzezinski 2000:82-89). After this stage in the process, the pace of the constitutional 
process slowed down. This lengthy process was a surprise to many, because it was 
assumed that the 1952 Constitution, a symbol of the communist regime, would soon 
be replaced (Brzezinski 2000:89). The task of drafting a new constitution was 
assigned to the Constitutional Commission of the National Assembly in 1993. It was 
chaired by Aleksander Kwasniewski, the leader of the Democratic Left Alliance, and 
the future president of Poland (Korbonski 2000a:137).  
 
19 52.71 percent in favor and 45.89 percent against the approval of the new constitution 
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In the 1993 Sejm, the rightist political parties were underrepresented because of the 
new electoral law. The electoral law was designed to mend the extreme fragmentation 
which had been highly visible in the 1991 Sejm. The law introduced electoral 
thresholds, and as a result the fragmented and small parties on the right did poorly21 
(Brzezinski 2000:90-117). As a result, the support of the rightist political parties was 
not reflected in the allocation of parliamentary seats. The commission in charge of 
drafting the new constitution therefore proposed to enlarge itself with representatives 
from non-parliamentary groups. The proposal made non-parliamentary political 
parties, churches and nationwide trade unions participate in the drafting. They were 
allowed to express their opinions, but prohibited from making motions (Brzezinski 
2000:117). The final draft can as a result be seen as a compromise between the parties 
elected to the Sejm in 1993and the non-parliamentary organizations (Brzezinski 
2000:125). The commission presented its final draft in 1996 (Batt and Wolczuk 
1998:91). 
6.2.2 The Ratification Process 
The Episcopate had an offensive approach to make its views heard in the important 
constitutional debate, and in the spring of 1995 the Catholic bishops had a three-day 
plenary session on constitutional issues. The meeting rejected the constitutional draft 
as being “against morality”. Cardinal Glemp described the formulations of the 
constitution as not meeting the expectations of the majority of the Poles (Michta 
1997:87). In this argumentation the rights of the majority is again used to justify the 
viewpoint of the Episcopate. This is in line with a democratic mind-set, but it loses 
much of its credibility because this argumentation is only used on the issues where 
the majority agrees with the Episcopate’s stance. 
                                                                                                                                           
20 42.86 percent of the population participated in the referendum. 
21 In percent, the clerical-nationalist right polled 30 percent of the votes in the 1991 parliamentary election and 21.5 percent 
in the 1993 parliamentary election. But in seats, this percentage transferred into 167 seats in 1991, but only 22 seats in 1993 
(Holm-Hansen 2002:107). 
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Other members of the Polish clerical hierarchy also made comments on the issue of 
the new democratic constitution. Bishop Napievala described the constitution as 
morally unsound, and Walesa’s favorite, priest Jankowski openly called upon his 
parishioners to vote no in the constitutional referendum (Anderson 2003a: 146, 
Anderson 2003b:82). Archbishop Jozef Michalik, the chairman of the Church’s 
constitutional committee, described the draft constitution as “nihilistic and 
unacceptable” (Korbonski 2000a:138, Ramet 1997:105). These statements 
underlined the religious organization’s hostile strategy. It is difficult to see a focus on 
compromise, tolerance or consensus-building, and the assumption must be that a 
“taming of politics” is yet to happen. 
Officially, the Church had a neutral stance in the referendum campaign (Eberts 
1998:835). But before the referendum, the Episcopate started a propaganda campaign 
which showed the institution’s skepticism toward the constitutional draft (Korbonski 
2000a:138). In some churches anti-constitutional leaflets were distributed, but the 
Church claimed no responsibility for these (Eberts 1998:835). The lack of sanctions 
for the distribution of anti-constitutional material indicated that there was also 
skepticism to the constitutional draft at the higher levels of the Episcopate. Cardinal 
Glemp’s attitude supports this interpretation. He said that people should vote 
according to their conscience, which can be interpreted as an implied threat to 
boycott the national referendum on the new constitution because of the Primate’s 
repeated criticism toward the constitutional draft during the debate (Korbonski 
2000a:137-138).  
The attacks on the draft ended in a call for the crowning of Jesus Christ the King of 
Poland by the leader of the AWS, Marian Krzaklewski. He wanted Primate Glemp to 
ask the Lord for help against the ratification of the new constitution, or “the 
Bolshevik attack” as he named the process. Krzaklewski also wanted Glemp to 
proclaim “the enthronement of Christ-the King” in Poland, but the Primate refused 
(Korbonski 2000a:138, Walicki 2000:41). The Cardinal’s behavior here, like in the 
case of Radio Maryja, showed that the Episcopate did not agree when the most 
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extreme viewpoints were presented. The Episcopate thus to some degree seem to 
moderate its stances. 
The analysis will now become more detailed to describe the strategy used in policy 
areas that the Episcopate found especially important in the constitutional draft. The 
Episcopate made three basic claims in the constitutional debate (Batt and Wolczuk 
1998:91, Byrnes 2001:30-31). These demands were made through an official 
statement on the constitution (Eberts 1998:834).  
6.2.3 Reference to Religion in the Constitution 
First, the Constitution should explicitly recognize the Polish Christian tradition as a 
source of national identity, since this identity encapsulates the history and culture of 
Poles (Byrnes 2001:30-31, Eberts 1998:834). This demand was especially important 
to the Episcopate because it had gone from being the major voice of the people to 
becoming one pressure group amongst many in the democratic setting. To argue its 
case, the Episcopate claimed that their status as majority church demanded a formal 
recognition (Anderson 2003a:153). Here one can again see the democratic 
argumentation often applied by the Church leaders; the majority position of the 
Catholic Church makes it deserve special consideration. 
Informally, the Episcopate supported the Solidarity-backed version of the 
constitution. This proposal was one of seven versions, and referred explicitly to the 
1000 year linkage between the population and Christianity and to “the heritage of 
Christian faith and culture” (Anderson 2003a:145). Bishop Pieronek declared: “The 
constitution, if it is to be for man and not against him, should not only guarantee ties 
between God and man but should also promote them and provide protection for 
them” (Ramet 1997:104). In this statement Pieronek declares that the constitution is 
against man if this claim is not fulfilled. Pieronek’s attitude shows a black-and-white 
thinking that rather supports a zero-sum view than “the taming of politics”.  
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Pieronek further stated that given Poland’s history and the role of Catholicism in 
recent events, there was a need for formal recognition of “the public and social life of 
the Church” (Anderson 2003b:82). The wish for recognition of the Church may be 
understandable since the communist regime had as an ideological goal to erase the 
role of the Church in both politics and society. Former President Walesa supported 
the Church’s stance, and stated in the debate that “Communist bandits ran the 
country for fifty years, but the Church for 1000 years… That is why you must not 
forget the roots of the nation. That is why this should be recorded”. The former 
president therefore claimed that it would be improper not to include a formal 
constitutional recognition of the Church’s role (Anderson 2003a:146, Anderson 
2003b:82). Walesa’s stance shows that the Episcopate had support from vital actors 
in the context also in the constitutional debate.  
Walesa’s statement was followed up by the Episcopate. In 1996 Archbishop 
Michalik, chairman of the Episcopate’s Constitutional Affairs Group, underlined that 
the Church could not accept the constitution if it had no reference to God (Anderson 
2003b:83). Here the rigidity in the Episcopate’s strategy is visible. The fact that the 
constitution was to be ratified by referendum, a democratic means which emphasizes 
the wishes of the majority, did not make the decision more acceptable to the bishops. 
If the bishops had chosen a strategy which emphasized the democratic values of 
compromise, tolerance and consensus-building, the strategy would probably have 
been more flexible. 
Finally, a compromise on the issue of a religious reference in the constitution was 
reached. A statement made by the liberal Catholic Tadeusz Mazowiecki referred 
equally to “those who believe in God” and to “those not sharing such a faith but 
respecting those universal values as arising from other sources”. The constitutional 
draft thereafter described the Polish culture as rooted in “a Christian heritage and 
universal human values” and identified the people’s responsibility “before God or 
one’s conscience” (Anderson 2003a:146).  
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This wording was unacceptable for some of the most fundamentalist bishops, who 
where against the juxtaposition of God and human conscience (Byrnes 2001:31-32). 
Maybe because of the Episcopate’s dissatisfaction, and its implicit threat to boycott 
the national referendum, Cardinal Glemp and the rest of the bishops finally secured 
the inclusion of the declaration from the 1921 Constitution: “The Roman Catholic 
faith, being the religion of the vast majority of the nation, has a leading position in 
the state among denominations with equal rights” (Demerath 2001:43).    
6.2.4 Moral issues 
The Episcopate did not want the Constitution to state that it was the highest law of 
the country (Byrnes 2001:30-31). Cardinal Glemp expressed this view already in 
1992 during his televised Christmas greetings to the nation: “God’s law is above 
human law” (Morawska 1995:63). Also bishop Pieronek expressed this view in an 
article in 1994: “Those who believe in God are convinced that the Lord God is the 
ultimate source of world order and of laws that govern mankind, and that some laws 
stemming from that source are not subject to change, which means that man can not 
violate them”. The idea of an unchangeable law of God turned out to be hard to 
operationalize into actual laws, and the Episcopate did not press this issue. The result 
was that the Polish constitution refers to itself as the highest law of the country 
(Byrnes 2001:30-31). But the idea of an unchangeable law had an impact on several 
important moral issues. According to Pieronek; “The Constitution should explicitly 
prohibit everything that is an obstacle to, or destroys man’s links to God, as well as 
man’s links to other men, particularly in the natural forms of interaction”. In 
practice, this meant that the Episcopate wanted to ban abortion from the point of 
conception and to declare marriage between two persons of the same sex illegal 
(Byrnes 2001:30-31, Ramet 1997:104).  
Concerning the abortion issue, the Constitution did not declare human life sacred 
from the moment of conception, but article 38 stated that “The Republic of Poland 
shall ensure the legal protection of the life of every human being” (Byrnes 2002:32, 
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Eberts 1998:834). This article was disputed because the Episcopate wanted it to state 
that human life was sacred from the moment of conception, in practice a total ban on 
abortion. Later, article 38 was effectively used by the Constitutional Tribunal in 1997 
to strengthen the anti-abortion camp. This shows the importance of the constitutional 
framework, and what possibilities it has to influence political decisions. 
Regarding the question of gay marriage, the Constitution limits marriage to “a union 
of a man and a woman” in article 18, a statement which is in line with the Catholic 
Church’s social teachings (Byrnes 2001:32). This was not a salient issue in the 
constitutional debate, probably because there was consensus on the issue not only 
within the Episcopate, but also in other segments of Polish society. 
6.2.5 Separation of Church and State  
Finally, the Episcopate expressed its opposition to any constitutional language 
requiring a separation of church and state. The bishops’ argument was that a 
separation would imply a previous lack of separation, and thereby imply that the 
Roman Catholic Church in communist times lived in a symbiosis with the state 
authorities. A separation of church and state in the constitution therefore, according 
to church leaders, meant that the Church during the communist era existed thanks to 
the state (Byrnes 2001:30-31). Considering the Church’s role in the communist 
break-down, the argument seems to have been constructed to gather support for the 
Church’s stance. The argument did probably not express a real fear to being seen as 
the ally of the communist regime, but it may have hindered criticism from those who 
believed that the Church chose a too pragmatic strategy toward the communist 
authorities.      
Already in 1991 the separation of church and state was on the agenda. Primate Glemp 
presented a public proposal to annul the 1952 Constitution’s separation of church and 
state because Poland was now ruled by the Catholic majority. In the Primate’s 
opinion this rule required the constitutional recognition of the majority’s religious 
confession (Grabowska 1994:261). The Episcopate did not press the issue because of 
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public protests, and because of the disapproval of the Vatican (Casanova 1994:110). 
This showed that pressure from the environment constrained the strategy chosen by 
the Episcopate. The pressure, however, did not make the Episcopate change its active 
strategy in the constitutional debate. Even if the guidelines from the highest authority 
of the Catholic Church, the Vatican, were against the Polish Episcopate’s meddling in 
politics, the Polish Episcopate chose vigorous involvement. The Polish Episcopate’s 
strategy in this case is therefore partly opposed to the declaration of the Vatican II 
Council (Casanova 1994:103). In this example, it seems like the democratic pressure 
from the context for moderation, did not have a significant impact on the 
Episcopate’s strategy. 
Bishop Pieronek, secretary of the Bishop’s Conference, accepted that state and 
church should be separate, but saw no need to make a formal statement about it in the 
constitution (Anderson 2003a:146). After clerical pressure, the constitutional 
commission agreed to replace the formulation “separation of church and state” with 
“independence and autonomy” between the two institutions. Article 19.3 of the 
Constitution states that “The relationship between the state, churches, and religious 
organizations shall be based on the principle of respect for their autonomy and 
mutual independence of each in their respective field, as well as on the principle of 
cooperation for human well-being and the common benefit” (Brzezinski 2000:126). 
In this case, the Church’s wish was granted. 
6.3 
                                             
The Concordat  
The contacts between Poland and the Holy See date back to the 16th century, but the 
communist regime put an end to this diplomatic relationship. After the fall of socialist 
rule, diplomatic relations was reestablished in 1989. When the constitution was 
ratified, it was underlined in article 2522 that a Concordat23 should exist between the 
 
22 It declared that “Relations between the Republic of Poland and the Roman Catholic Church shall be determined by 
international treaty concluded with the Holy See” (Anderson 2003b:83, Byrnes 2001:32) 
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Republic of Poland and the Holy See (Korbonski 2000a:136).. The current version of 
this agreement was written in 1993, and signed in late July by President Walesa and 
Pope John Paul II. It consists of 29 articles and begins with the words “The Catholic 
religion is practiced by the majority of the Polish population” (Castle and Taras 
2002:143).   
The Concordat clarifies several aspects of the Roman Catholic Church’s role in post-
communist Poland. It guarantees that public schools and kindergartens will organize 
religious education if there is a demand, and it declares that crucifixes can be placed 
in public buildings24 (Eberts 1998:833, Holm-Hansen 2002:98). The Concordat also 
make Catholic marriages legally binding, and gives priests access to public 
institutions; military units, prisons, and education and welfare institutions. It grants 
subsidies to some Catholic educational establishments; the Papal Theological 
Academy in Krakow and the Catholic University of Lublin (Anderson 2003a:146, 
Anderson 2003b:79). In addition to this, the Concordat also obliges the state to 
provide financial support for the maintenance of buildings and works of art belonging 
to the Church (Eberts 1998:833). Taken together, this can be interpreted as giving 
special recognition to the Catholic Church at the expense of other denominations.  
After being negotiated since late 1992, the concordat was signed on July 28, 1993 –
after the Suchocka Government had received a vote of no confidence, and while the 
Sejm was dissolved (Castle and Taras 2002:143, Grzybowski and Mikuli 2004:194). 
The result was that the Concordat was signed without the parliament’s participation. 
The Prime Minister, Hanna Suchocka, defended this action, and stated that it was no 
other way to have it signed. She said that no international agreement had been 
negotiated with parliament in its early stages before, and stated that negotiations 
should take place after the treaty was signed, but before its ratification (Osiatynski 
1996: 48). The way in which the Concordat was signed, may indicate that it was not 
                                                                                                                                           
23 The Concordat is an agreement which regulates the diplomatic contacts between Poland and the Holy See.  
24 One is in fact placed in the National Parliament.  
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only the Episcopate that had a pragmatic approach toward democracy. It seems like 
also their allies exploited the possibilities of the system. In this way, it seems that the 
acceptance to bend the rules augmented, and as a result the democratic pressure from 
the context was weakened.    
The signing sparked a public debate. The critics said that the negotiations were 
conducted in a too secretive manner, and also that the Concordat was too hastily 
signed (Korbonski 2000a:136). The document was criticized because it appeared to 
treat church and state as equal partners and to privilege the Church (Anderson 
2003b:81). Representatives from religious minorities and liberal dissidents argued 
that the institutionalization of rights of the Catholic Church in the Concordat could be 
damaging to non-believers. The Church on the other hand, stated that the Concordat 
gave no privilege, just freedom for the Church to carry out its mission (Anderson 
2003a:147). The Episcopate’s behavior does not support the theory of democratic 
consolidation, which emphasizes dialogue with, and tolerance of, different out-groups 
as a means to consolidate democracy and make it firmer.  
After the debate, the Sejm decided to delay the necessary parliamentary ratification of 
the concordat until after the new Constitution was passed (Korbonski 2000a:136). In 
July 1996, as in April 1995, the Sejm thus decided to postpone the ratification (Chan 
2000:184, Korbonski 2000a:137). Bishop Pieronek, Secretary General of the 
Episcopate, commented that the Concordat was a victim of a “perfidious political 
game” (Chan 2000:184). The statement does not show a high regard of 
democratically taken decisions when they work against the Church’s wishes. Instead, 
the pronouncement underlines the Church’s ambiguous attitude toward the new 
system.  Democracy is criticized when it hinders the Episcopate in realizing its 
political goals, while it is tolerated if the norms and procedures work to the benefit of 
the Episcopate.  When the Concordat was delayed the second time, Cardinal Glemp 
stated that “[While] the Church wants peace, it is not afraid of war” (Korbonski 
2000a:137). The strategy applied in this example, is in line with the Episcopate’s 
behavior in previously analyzed empirical examples. The Church applies a hostile 
 74 
language, but it does not actively break the rules of democracy, and does not act in a 
way that totally alienates possible partners in the future.  
After the November 1995 presidential election, President Kwasniewski suggested to 
the Catholic Church that further bilateral talks with the Holy See should be arranged. 
The goal of these talks was to make compromises on some of the problematic issues 
in the draft Concordat. But Bishop Pieronek declared that the Church was not 
interested, because “The Episcopate had already devoted too much time to the issue, 
and had not been treated seriously”. In spite of his outburst, Pieronek later met with 
the president (Ramet 1997:104). This may signify that there are room for 
compromises and consensus-building even if the strategy applied by the bishops often 
seems to be rigid.  
The rightist AWS alliance got the plurality of the votes in 1997, and the new 
government ratified the 1993 Concordat (Chan 2000:188). It was officially signed on 
April 24, 1998 (Korbonski 2000a:137). This testifies to the continued strength of the 
Church on the political scene, and to its ability to make its views heard. Maybe 
because of this ability, the Church has not felt the need to choose a more 
accommodating approach toward its environment. 
6.4 Chapter review 
6.4.1 Strategy toward the Political Challenge of Democracy 
The analysis shows how the Episcopate’s demands were modified and became 
compromises in the final version of the constitutional draft. The Episcopate did not 
find these compromises satisfying, and launched a campaign against the ratification 
of the draft constitution. This shows the religious organization’s difficulties in 
handling the gives and takes of democracy. The strategy can be a result of the black-
and-white thinking of the Episcopate. Sartori’s notion of “the taming of politics”, 
which prevents politics from becoming a zero-sum game, does not seem to apply 
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here. The tendency to look at politics as a zero-sum game can be seen in the debate 
on a reference to God when the Episcopate said that it would not accept the 
constitution if it did not include such a reference. The stance was not affected by the 
fact that the constitution was to be ratified in a democratically decided referendum. 
In the empirical example of the Concordat, the strategy seems similar to the one 
applied in the constitutional debate. The same hostile language is used in the debate, 
and the will to make compromises seems to be practically lacking. This can be seen 
in Cardinal Glemp’s statement when the Concordat’s ratification was delayed: 
“[While] the Church wants peace, it is not afraid of war”.  In the debate, an 
inconsistent attitude toward democracy can be observed; Democracy is criticized 
when it hinders the Episcopate in realizing its political goals, while it is tolerated if 
the norms and procedures work to benefit the Episcopate.  
But still there seem to be room for negotiations, even if a rigid strategy is applied. 
The assumption is supported by bishop Pieronek’s behavior. He first dismissed the 
President’s proposition to negotiate on the issue of the Concordat, but later he met 
with the President. This behavior may be seen as a moderation of conflict, and a 
attempt of consensus-building, but the possible results of a “taming of politics” are 
still not striking in the Episcopate’s strategy toward the political challenge of 
democracy.   
6.4.2 The Impact of Democratic Context 
Many of the Episcopate’s demands were met in the constitutional debate, although 
not without that other needs and views were taken into consideration, and had impact 
on the results. Also in the debate on the Concordat, the agreement was ratified at last, 
in spite of strong opposition. From the Episcopate’s achievements in the two 
empirical examples, it can thus be said that the actor was able to gather support for its 
positions. 
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The Episcopate had backing in the context from several major actors on the clerical 
side of Polish politics; among them were Former President Walesa, the Suchocka 
government, and the leader of the AWS, Marian Krzaklewski. Therefore, the context 
did probably not provide an unambiguous pressure to moderate politics, even if the 
Vatican and public protests may have had moderating effects. One such moderating 
effect may have been visible when bishop Pieronek was willing to negotiate with the 
President on the Concordat.  
It can be hypothesized that as a result of the lack of an unambiguous democratic 
pressure from the environment, the Episcopate was able to ignore the moderating 
pressures from the Vatican because it had many prominent supporters in its 
immediate context. 
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7. Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
7.2 
This thesis has focused on the Polish Episcopate’s strategy in the post-communist era, 
and tried to answer how the strategy of the Polish Episcopate has been formed by the 
new democratic context. In order to address these questions three main challenges 
that a religious organization must face in a democratic setting has been analyzed; the 
ideological, the social, and the political challenges of democracy. Here, these 
challenges are called the democratic challenges. 
The Episcopate’s approach to these challenges has been evaluated in relation to the 
theory of democratic consolidation. This theory foresees that actors who participate 
in the process of democratic consolidation will be affected by this process, and 
experience a “taming of politics”. The “taming of politics” means that the actors, 
because of their exposure to a democratic environment, develop a greater awareness 
of the core values and norms of this regime: compromise, tolerance and consensus-
building. 
Strategy toward the Democratic Challenges 
The theory of democratic consolidation thus specifies consolidation as a process 
which generates increasingly stronger pressure to act according to the values of 
compromise, tolerance and consensus-building. Hence, the process of democratic 
consolidation increasingly “tames politics”. The theoretical prediction was the reason 
why the study is a longitudinal case study because this type of study should be able to 
analyze changes over time. The analysis does not indicate that the contextual pressure 
has increased over time. Therefore, the prediction of the theory of democratic 
consolidation does not seem to be supported by the empirical evidence.  
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From the empirical examples analyzed in the thesis, it seems like the Polish 
Episcopate’s strategy toward the challenges of democracy has not been marked by a 
focus on compromise, tolerance and consensus-building. Instead, the Polish bishops 
seem to have a tendency to look at politics like a zero-sum game. The focus on 
confrontation instead of compromise can be seen generally in the Episcopate’s 
approach to the democratic challenges, and the Episcopate’s characteristic harsh tone 
does not support that Sartori’s “taming of politics” had taken place. 
The Episcopate has shown a pragmatic attitude toward democratic values when 
addressing the democratic challenges. Its strategy seems to be governed more by its 
goals in the issues debated, then by general democratic principles. This assumption is 
strengthened by the Episcopate’s behavior when it belongs to the majority versus 
when it belongs to the minority. In a majority position it claims that the sheer number 
of Catholics justifies their domination in questions concerning the constitutional 
framework or religious education in public schools, while when it holds the minority 
view, the institution has another view of which numbers that deserves to be 
considered in a political decision. This is the case in moral issues, where the 
Episcopate agrees with the minority. Here the clergy maintains that these issues can 
not be subject to majority decision. 
The Polish Episcopate has hardly focused on broad consensus-building in its strategy 
in post-communist Poland. Instead, it has chosen to build coalitions with clerical-
national actors who mainly hold the same convictions as the religious organization 
itself. This means that the Episcopate has chosen a narrow strategy, and the actor has 
not tried to broaden its support base by choosing a less sharp line. As a consequence, 
a softening of its politics has not taken place, and its appeal has therefore not been 
broadened in order to increase its consensus-building potential.The narrow strategy of 
the Episcopate can for example be seen in the debate on the constitution. Even if the 
Episcopate’s most important demands to a large degree were granted by the 
Constitutional Committee, the Episcopate did not focus on building consensus in the 
areas where compromises where reached. Instead, it pressed even harder for its own 
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views, and launched a campaign against the ratification of the draft constitution when 
their demands were modified in the democratic process. The same strategy can be 
seen in the debate on the Concordat, also in this empirical example the Episcopate 
chose to focus on its own demands instead of trying to find solutions that could be 
embraced by the broader public 
The almost lacking of focus on compromise, tolerance and consensus-building in the 
Episcopate’s behavior can be due to the fact that much of its goals have been reached, 
at least partly, by applying a confrontational strategy. This leads to a lack of 
incentives to change to a more compromise-oriented strategy. But the Episcopate’s 
strategy had certain moderations. These moderations were particularly visible in the 
Episcopate’s relationship with the Jewish minority. 
7.3 The Impact of Democratic Context 
In the empirical example which analyzes the Episcopate’s relationship with the 
Jewish community, democratic pressure from the environment seemed to pressure the 
bishops to choose an approach focused on tolerance. In the other empirical examples, 
the lack of unambiguous democratic pressure from the environment seemed to permit 
the Episcopate to choose its strategy more independently of the context. The finding 
allows a specification of the theory of democratic consolidation; from the empirical 
examples it can be hypothesized that how strong an impact democratic consolidation 
makes on an actor’s mind-set depends on the level of democratic pressure from the 
environment.  
The analysis shows that the Episcopate enjoyed support for its stances from vital 
actors in the environment on the abortion issue, the issue of religious instruction, the 
constitutional issue, and the issue of the Concordat. Also the Episcopate’s attitude 
toward democracy had certain similarities with the way other important actors looked 
upon the issue. The support from the context probably allowed the Episcopate to 
ignore the intolerant tendencies within its own ranks. It can be hypothesized that 
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because of the support, or the indifference in the Orthodox example, from the 
environment, the context did not generate an unambiguous democratic pressure. An 
exception is the Jewish example, where national and international pressures seemed 
to force the Episcopate to choose a strategy with more emphasis on tolerance. 
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